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I. INTRODUCTION

Carlos Santiago Nino1 was an all-around jurist. He took no
part in the rigid compartmentalization of academic disciplines
dominating our universities.2 From the beginning, his interests
included an extremely wide range of problems extending to criminal law,3 constitutional law,4 family law,5 legal theory,6 the
foundation of human rights,7 ethics and the theory of action.'

1. Born in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on November 3, 1943, Carlos Nino was
married to Susana Bergstein and had two sons, Ezequiel and Mariano. He died in
La Paz, Bolivia, on August 29, 1993. Nino graduated with honors from the University of Buenos Aires Law School in 1967, and in 1977, received his Ph. D. in Philosophy, emphasis on Legal Philosophy, from Oxford University.
Since his early youth, Nino had shown a clear predilection for intellectual
work. This vocation found its expression in a dozen books and over sixty articles. He
combined his prolific activities as a researcher with an inexhaustible passion for
teaching. Over the years, Nino served as a visiting scholar at Harvard (1977), UCLA
(1987) and at the University of Freiburg, F.R.G. (1982). Since 1978, he held a research fellowship at the Argentinean National Council for Scientific and Technical
Research. As for his teaching, Nino was Professor of Legal Philosophy at the University of Buenos Aires and Visiting Professor at the University of New York (1988),
Yale (1987, 1989 and 1991-1993) and at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra of Barcelona,
among others. Brilliant and unrelenting in his discussion, Nino participated in innumerable conferences in a great number of universities all over the world. Such participation included conferences in San Marcos (Lima, Peru, 1972); Cornell (1977);
Fxankfurt/M. (F.R.G., 1982); Helsinki (1984), Graz (1984); Salzburg (1984); Lund
(1984); Universidad Aut6noma de Madrid (1986); Centro de Estudios Constitucionales
(Madrid, 1988); San Diego (1989); Norwegian Academy of Science (1990); Universitat
Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona, 1990); Supreme Court of Guatemala (1991); Pisa (1991);
Florence (1991); Universidad Aut6noma de Barcelona (1992), and others.
Carlos Nino's feverish activity, however, was not limited to academic research
and teaching; he also realized political aspirations. During the Alfonsin administration, he held various political posts: Presidential Advisor 1983-1989; Coordinator of
the Council for the Consolidation of Democracy 1985-1989; member of the Committee
on the Reform of the Criminal Code at the Secretary of Justice in 1985. He was
also a member of the commission engaged in drafting a new Constitution for the
Republic of Bolivia. Nino died while working on this project. Interestingly, he died in
the middle of a sentence which urged the need for a new Constitution.
2. This compartmentalization of academic disciplines is the product of corporate interests rather than scientific and intellectual necessities or practical convenience.
3. See, e.g., CARLOS NINO, EL CONCURSO EN EL DERECHO PENAL (1972);
CARLOS NINO, Los LiMITEs DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD PENAL (Guillermo Rafael
Navarro trans., 1980); CARLOS NINO, LA LEGiTIMA DEFENSA (1982).
4. See, e.g., CARLOS NINO, FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL (1992).

5. Nino was preparing a paper on family law at the time of his death.
6. See, e.g., CARLOS NINO, LA VALIDEZ DEL DERECHO (Astrea ed., 1985).
7. See, e.g., CARLOS NINO, EtTICA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS (1984).
8. See, e.g., CARLOS NINO, EL CONSTRUCTIVISMO ETICO (1989); CARLOS NINO,
INTRODUCCIN A LA FILOSOFiA DE LA ACCION HUMANA (1987).
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Convinced that intellectual work could not and should not be
separated from political work, and that political action is more
appropriate when preceded by rational discussion, Nino wrote a
number of papers regarding reasons to implement specific political measures.'
Since a detailed description of Carlos Nino's thinking would
by far surpass the scope and purpose of this Article, I intend
only to mention his most relevant contributions in the area of
legal philosophy and to forward reasons for their significance.
My presentation will be divided into six Parts. Each section will
be dedicated to Carlos Nino's conception of the following topics:
Metaethics, Human Rights, the Law, Democracy, the Constitution, and Politics.
II. METAETHICS

Carlos Nino himself defines his metaethical position as
"moral constructivism," a term taken from Rawls and indicating
a certain familial likeness with the positions adopted by, among
others, Bruce Ackerman, Kurt Baier, William Frankena, Jiirgen
Habermas, Thomas Nagel, David Richards, and John Rawls
himself."0 As Nino himself acknowledged, his constructivism is
indebted to Hobbes and to Kant. From the first, Nino adopts the
notion that morality fulfills certain social functions; from the
second, he analyzes the formal prerequisites of moral reasoning.
The Hobbesian and the Kantian aspect are integrated in Nino's
interpretation of morality as a social practice intended to solve
conflicts and to promote cooperation through consent, while
simultaneously affirming that this practice has a formal and
even substantial structure making it especially well suited to
fulfill those functions.
It is a well known fact that the deepest ethical disagreement has traditionally concentrated on two closely connected
9. See, e.g., CARLOS NINo, UN PAiS AL MARGEN DE LA LEY (1992); Carlos

Nino, The Human Rights Policy of the Argentine Constitutional Government: A Reply,
11 YALE J. IN'IVL L. 217 (1985) [hereinafter The Human Rights Policy]; Carlos Nino,
Transition to Democracy, Corporatism and Constitutional Reform in Latin America,
44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 129 (1989) [hereinafter Transition to Democracy]; Carlos Nino,
La Legitimidad, Estabilidady Eficiencia del Presidencialismo,in PRESIDENCIALISMO Y
GOBERNABILIDAD EN ARGENTINA (1992).

10. See ETICA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, supra note 7, at 92. As in all families,

there are varying degrees of similarities and differences between them.
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questions: (1) Whether there are any moral facts, and if so, (2)
whether it is possible to know them. However, Nino believed
that the central problem of ethics is neither ontological nor
epistemological, but rather a conceptual one: "In other words, I
think that the question posed by moral facts does not concern
their existence or their knowledge, but their recognition as
such.""
If the problem is conceptual, then it can only be solved by
conceptual analysis. Furthermore, if one rejects all essentialist
claims and accepts instead that the source of all concepts is
conventions, then one would have to conclude that there is not a
single concept of morality and that the utility of the different
concepts depends on the context in which they are used and on
the ends they are used for. The concept of morality has been
employed as much for descriptive ends, in explanatory contexts,
as for normative ends. Therefore, Nino supposed that reconstructing moral concepts, and the concept of morality itself, will
serve to both identify social institutions widely recognized as
valid and satisfy certain basic needs of life." Nino further believed that these concepts have to be characterized in a way so
as not to disturb the functioning of these institutions. 3 The
first condition results from a descriptive and the second from a
practical preoccupation."
When using the word "morality" one may be referring either
to positive, social morality or to an ideal, critical morality. Many
ethical disagreements have arisen precisely because this distinction, and the relationship between the two sides, has been neglected. According to Nino, social morality is the product of the
formulation and acceptance of judgments intended to describe an
ideal morality. Without the hope of acting in accordance with an
ideal morality, there would be no positive morality. Thus, ideal
morality logically exists prior to positive morality. The judgments which social morality refers to indicate facts (e.g., in society X there is a rule Z prescribing... ), and as such, they cannot
serve a justificatory function. Positive morality concerns only the
prudent, who adjust their conduct to a norm in order to avoid
the unpleasant consequences connected with its violation. In

11.
12.
13.
14.

EL CONSTRUCTMSMO ETICO, supra note 8, at 62.

Id. at 66.
Id.

Id.
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contrast, moral agents (i.e., those who wish to justify their actions) are only interested in ideal morality. And, as Nino observed: "Paradoxically, positive morality is created through the
acts and attitudes not of the prudent, but only of the moral. A
social morality can be maintained only insofar as there is some
degree of convergence in the critical moral judgments people are
willing to formulate." 5
Therefore, while it is improper to confuse social morality
with ideal morality, it is equally improper to completely separate
one from the other. The only distinction between these two
forms of judgments is that the first are accepted socially (independently of whether or not they are valid), while the second are
valid (independently of whether they are socially accepted).
However, if a valid judgment is socially accepted, then ideal
morality, in this instance, also constitutes social morality. Conversely, if a socially accepted judgment is valid, then it is also
part of ideal morality.
Nino recognized that the complex relation between social
and ideal morality requires an examination of the moral practice
of society in order to determine what criteria any judgment whether valid or not - must satisfy in order to be a moral judgment. Because society's moral practice intends to formulate
judgments of an ideal morality (and this intention is independent of whether the formulation turns out to be correct), the
criteria for the validity of moral judgments are contained in
moral practice. Thus, in describing a society's morality, both the
rules enforced and the practice used in deliberative discourse for
giving reasons in favor or against certain conducts must be mentioned. These considerations bind Nino's position to certain types
of moderate conventionalism. These issues are discussed in
Nino's critique of communitarianism, infra.
According to Nino, forms of discourse are the relevant moral
social practices one must examine: "Moral discourse aims at
reaching a convergence of actions and attitudes, through the
individuals' free acceptance of principles guiding their actions
and their attitudes toward the actions of others. This is
morality's characteristic of autonomy ....

15.

ETICA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, supra note 7, at 93.

16.

Id. at 109.
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According to this characterization, the moral discourse proposed by Nino must be legitimate discourse, free of compulsion,
deception or reference to any authority. Additionally, discourse
depends on consent. Moral discourse implies the adoption of an
impartial perspective. For individuals to freely consent to principles of conduct, the principles must satisfy the following minimal conditions: they must be public, i.e., recognizable by all;
they must be general, in the sense that they establish normative
solutions based upon certain properties and concerning generic
relations; they must be supervenient with respect to factual circumstances, that is, with respect to all the factual circumstances
under which the normative solutions which must be knowable
by everyone are reached; they must be universal, if they justify
the action of one person, they must also serve to justify that of
any other person under the same circumstances; lastly, they
must be final, the principles must be the last justification of
actions and practices. For these reasons, a moral judgment formulated in the practice of moral discourse can be characterized
as,
a judgment which predicates of action X that it is required,
under certain circumstances defined by factual properties of a
generic type, by a public principle that would be accepted as
a last and universal justification for actions by any person
fully rational, absolutely impartial and informed of all the
relevant facts. 7
In short, Nino has suggested that morality is a human artifact depending on human actions and that moral judgments
formulated by human beings may be true or false depending on
whether they give a correct account of moral facts. The dispute
over moral facts marks the differences between ethical theories.
In his version of ethical constructivism, Nino proposes to reconstruct this notion of moral fact in the following way: It refers to
the acceptance, under ideal conditions of impartiality, rationality
and factual knowledge, of those principles which satisfy the
prerequisites mentioned above and jointly contribute to the
solution of problems in a cooperative consensus. This notion of
moral fact is counterfactual because it relies in claiming that
something would happen if something else happened, but which

17. Id. at 117.
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does not actually occur. According to Nino, acceptance of this
counterfactual does not imply a sumptuous or metaphysical
ontology because its acceptance is identical to that of
counterfactuals in the natural sciences. We must attempt to
determine which principles would be accepted if ideal conditions
of moral discourse actually were obtained. This requires not an
empirical but a conceptual reflection.
As stated earlier, Nino's metaethical position is one of ethical constructivism. His objective in reconstructing moral concepts is to identify practices that fulfill relevant social functions.
These concepts must be consistent with the fulfillment and development of these functions. Nino's distinction between ideal
and social morality perceives the truth-character of moral judgments. Nino described the facts constituted by the acceptance of
such principles as follows:
[M]oral philosophy has great moral relevance: the more it
tries to clarify the rules that are constitutive of an institution
which satisfies certain highly valuable social functions, the
more the operationality and efficacy of this institution is
promoted, since those who participate in it (all of us, insofar
as we participate in disputing the justification of an action or
decision) will get a clearer picture of the 'game' they are playing, and will get better at it. This obviously does not serve to
justify morality and moral philosophy without circularity, but
since our conscience does not have too many logical scruples,
it does serve at least to put it at rest while we dedicate ourselves to this activity instead of taking on some other, more
obviously beneficial job.'"
Any presentation of Carlos Nino's metaethical position
would be hopelessly incomplete without mentioning two authors
with whom he was in permanent dialogue, and whose perspectives, through agreement and disagreement, became the basis
for his own theoretical constructions. These authors are John
Rawls and JUrgen Habermas. By analyzing their writings Nino
attempted to develop a conception of moral knowledge he calls
"epistemological constructivism": "[A] conception according to
which social practice is an adequate means to such knowl-

18.

EL CONSTRUCTMSMO EtTICO, supra note 8, at 71.
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Nino adopted a notion of uncertainty regarding the
metaethical position which Rawls uses as his ultimate basis for
two principles of justice. This uncertainty is confirmed by Rawls'
position reflected in his A Theory of Justice. Rawls finds recourse in several metaethical theories. For example, he adopted
contractualism, holding that his principles of justice would be
accepted in the original position. He also used rational-choice
theory as a foundation for his principles invoking the method of
maximin. Even intuitionism crept into Rawls' work. He affirmed
that there exists a reflective equilibrium between the principles
which would be adopted in the original position and our most
deeply rooted intuitions. Finally, in order to justify his moral
principles, Rawls invoked the formal prerequisites of moral
discourse. He recognized that principles of justice must satisfy
the conditions of generality, impartiality, publicity, and universality.
According to Nino, moral discourse is the one metaethical
foundation of Rawls' principles which is most consistent with his
own work and which also gives greater coherence to the totality
of the various metaethical criteria he invokes. From this point of
view, the original position would simply be a dramatization of
the formal requirements of such discourse. The hypothetical
contract only points to the aspect that principles are valid if they
are unanimously accepted under ideal circumstances. Self-interest and the veil of ignorance represent the condition of impartiality,20 etc. This would also be the version of Rawls closest to
Kant.

On the other hand, Rawls' method for knowing moral truth
is just as uncertain, although in A Theory of Justice there are
several indicators suggesting that Rawls tends toward individualism in epistemological matters. According to Nino, Rawls
clearly showed his epistemological individualism when he spoke
of majority rule as the justification of democracy.
In fact, distinguishing between ontological and
epistemological theses, Nino thinks that Rawls sustained the
following ontological thesis:

19. Id. at 93.
20. Id. at 97.
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Moral truth is constituted by the satisfaction of formal prerequisites inherent in the practical reasoning of all individuals, especially the one that a moral principle is valid if it can
be accepted by everyone, or cannot be rejected by anyone,
under ideal conditions of impartiality, rationality, and knowledge of the relevant facts.2
Rawls' epistemological thesis would be as follows:
Knowledge of moral truth is accessible only through individual reflection determining, by way of a method of reflective
equilibrium or some alternative, whether the proper relation
between formal prerequisites and substantive principles obtains. Discussion with others is a useful auxiliary tool for
individual reflection, but in the last instance, we inescapably
must act according to the final dictates of the latter.'
Nino thought that the writings of Habermas, the German
author, supported the justification of moral judgments as part of
a social practice dominating a substantial portion of our lives;
only by considering this practice can the truth or falsehood of
moral judgments be determined. Accordingly, norms stand between speech acts and empirical reality. The truth-character of
moral judgments must be different from the truth-character of
factual descriptive sentences. While the truth of empirical sentences is independent of theoretical discourse, the truth of moral
judgments depends on practical discourse.
In this discourse people present differing arguments, in a
regulated way that presupposes ideal conditions, in favor or
against different claims of validity, striving to reach consensus.
Such a consensus can be reached because of the principle of
universality, representing the moral requirement of impartiality.
Nino believed that Habermas can be interpreted in one of two
ways. One may view Habermas as an epistemological
constructivist because his conception of the ideal situation of
discourse permits moral principles to be known indirectly,
through the result of discourse. He may also be considered an
ontological constructivist since many of his writings teach that
moral principles are the result of discourse under ideal circum-

21. Id. at 124.

22. Id.
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stances. In short, Habermas' ontological thesis provides:
[Mioral truth consists in the consensus resulting, de facto,
from the actual practice of moral discourse when it is performed respecting procedural constraints for the arguments
as, for example, that a principle must be acceptable or nonrejectable for everyone under ideal conditions of impartiality,
rationality, and information."
Epistemologically,
[t]he method of discussion and collective decision-making is
the only possible way of access to moral truth in the area of
justice, since monological reflection is always distorted by the
individuals' prejudices in favor of themselves, by their contextual conditionality and the insurmountable difficulty of putting oneself 'in somebody else's shoes'. Only the actual consensus obtained after a long debate with as little exclusions,
manipulations and inequalities as possible is a trustworthy
guide to the requirements of morality.24
Nino, in reconstructing the central theses of Rawls and
Habermas, stated that,
Habermas coincides with Rawls in that there are formal
requirements, as that of impartiality, which are decisive for
the validity of moral principles. But while for Rawls they are
formal prerequisites of monological moral reasoning, for
Habermas they are rules of a social practice of intersubjective
discourse. Besides, while for Rawls the validity of moral principles derives from the fact that they satisfy the requirement
of impartiality, among other things, independently of whether
anybody declares that it is satisfied, there is reason to think
that for Habermas validity requires that a de facto consensus
has been reached in application of the rule of impartiality. Finally, while for Rawls it seems that one can come to the conclusion that a moral principle is valid by way of individual
reflection, although discussion may play an auxiliary role, for
Habermas this is obviously impossible, and only collective
search for truth" is a trustworthy
discussion, the "cooperative
25
road to moral knowledge.

23. Id. at 105.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 104.
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On an ontological level, Nino criticized Rawls' approach for
failing to recognize moral discourse as a social practice. By Emphasizing practice, one creates an empirical basis from which to
infer de facto rules and criteria - prerequisites for the practice
itself. Social practice fulfills social functions; it contains rules
and prerequisites that ensure its continued viability. Finally,
this practice also contains substantive principles such as autonomy that permit the derivation of substantive norms without
begging the question.
Habermas did not escape Nino's ontological criticisms.
Habermas confuses validity and efficacy and ends up in
relativist conventionalism. Furthermore, he, apparently, does
not adequately account for the phenomenology of moral discourse insofar as this discourse is not characterized by the expression of personal interests, but by the confrontation of different claims of validity. On the other hand, however, those who
participate in moral discourse could not claim the validity of
their proposals if it could only be determined by the discussions
outcome. And it would make no sense to submit a principle to
discussion if it were not first accompanied by a claim of validity.
On the ontological level, Nino's thesis reflects Habermas'
position insofar as it recognizes the empirical basis of moral
discourse as a social practice. However, Nino did not commit
himself to the result of an empirical consensus. He affirmed that
moral truth is established in accordance with the formal and
material requirements of moral discourse. Among those requirements, he recognized the principle of autonomy as well as procedural rules like the one that embodies the principle of impartiality. Here, his debt to Rawls is obvious.
On the epistemological level, Nino seemed to accept
Habermas' thesis that discussion followed by collective decisionmaking is the proper method for knowing moral truth. This is so
not only because free discussion brings out the errors in an argument, but also because it is the only way to guarantee the
principle of impartiality. This could, however, lead to a type of
moral populism when moral discourse becomes institutionalized
and democratic decisions are reached through the application of
majority rule. Therefore, Nino proposes the following as his own
ontological thesis:

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
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[M]oral truth is constituted by formal or procedural prerequisites of a discursive social practice aimed at cooperation and
the avoidance of conflict, on the basis of the convergence of
actions and attitudes through consensual acceptance of behavior-guiding principles. Among these prerequisites of the
social practice of moral discourse is that a principle is valid
when it is acceptable, or non-rejectable, by everyone under
conditions of impartiality, rationality, and factual
knowledge."
As his epistemological thesis he espouses that,
[d]iscussion and intersubjective decision-making is the most
trustworthy procedure for reaching moral truth, since the
exchange of ideas and the necessity to justify them before
others not only broadens knowledge and brings to light fallacious reasoning, but especially because it allows to determine
whether the requirement of impartial consideration of
everyone's interests is satisfied, presuming that there are no
better judges of the respective interests than the affected
persons themselves who participate in the collective process
of discussion. However, this does not exclude that someone
can acquire knowledge of correct solutions through individual
reflection, although it must be admitted that this method is
much less trustworthy, above all because of the difficulty of
faithfully representing the interests of others and, therefore,
of being impartial.27
In other words, Nino held that the social practice of moral discourse, even in the form of democracy as an imperfect surrogate,
is the most trustworthy procedure for getting to moral truth.
Individual reflection under conditions of impartiality, generality
and universality may provide another adequate method for moral knowledge, especially where it is doubtful whether the prerequisites of moral discourse are actually satisfied. Nino's
epistemological constructivism is thus closer to Rawls than to
Habermas. This is probably why Nino himself defimed his position as halfway between that of Rawls' and Habermas'.

26. Id. at 105.
27. Id.
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III. HUMAN RIGHTS

A great part of Carlos Nino's intellectual reputation is certainly due to his writings on the concept and foundation of human rights. This topic attracted him both theoretically and morally; he felt compelled to do all he could to promote the effective
implementation of those rights. One can find the main aspects of
Nino's conception of human rights in his seminal work Etica y
Derechos Humanos.28 Nino holds that human rights are derived
from a system of moral principles. Those principles are said to
have the following properties: (1) Their existence depends on
their intrinsic validity or acceptability (i.e., they are independent
of their recognition by any legal order or their social acceptance);
(2) they are accepted as a final or ultimate justification of behavior (i.e., there is no other class of principles with higher justificatory weight); and (3) they serve to evaluate all kinds of conduct.
Whether or not a behavior is morally relevant cannot be
decided a priori; it depends on the content of basic moral principles. Human rights should be characterized as deriving from
moral principles. According to the methodology proposed by
Nino, we must first determine from which moral principles basic
rights are derived, and then define as moral persons those who
have the properties de facto necessary to enjoy or exercise such
rights.
The idea is that moral personality is a concept related not
with the fact of being the addressee of fundamental moral
rights but with the fact of being in the condition of exercising
or enjoying them. Who is a moral person therefore depends
on who can enjoy the rights generated by the basic moral
principles.'
Nino proposes three moral principles from which human
rights are derived: the principle of personal inviolability, the
principle of personal autonomy, and the principle of personal
dignity.

28. ETICA Y DERECHOs HUMANOS, supra note 7.
29. Id. at 45.

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:1

The principle of personal autonomy prescribes:
[T]hat, because of the value of the free individual choice of
life plans and the adoption of ideals of human excellence, the
State (and other individuals) may not interfere in this choice
or adoption; it must content itself with designing institutions
that promote the individual pursuit of these life plans and
the satisfaction of the ideals of virtue everyone sustains, and
prevent mutual interference in the course of this pursuit.3"
Acceptance of this principle bars the possibility of all unjustified
perfectionist or paternalistic theses. Perfectionism as well as
paternalism suppose that there are some life plans that are
better than others and which constitute the realization of ideals
of excellence. Additionally, perfectionism supposes that these
ideals should be imposed, first to force people to become better,
and secondly to prevent people from harming themselves. While
Nino accepted the thesis that some life plans are better than
others, he did not follow those who mistakenly believe that the
two concepts are ethically acceptable. He explicitly rejected the
idea that they would justify the imposition of any life plan by
the State.
The principle of autonomy operates in both an empowering
and protective capacity. It stresses freedom of choice regarding
models of life and acts as a protective wall against possible interference by the State or other persons. Accepting the principle
of personal autonomy implies acceptance of an individual's subjective preferences, even those believed to be wrong, constrained
only by the prohibition of harm to others. From this basic idea
which has been presented here in a rather dogmatic, overly
succinct way - Nino derived a number of rights that the principle of autonomy protects or requires.
The most basic benefit one can infer guarantees the freedom
to do whatever one wishes, as long as it does not harm others.
Note that this presupposes a right to conscious life and physical
and psychic integrity. In order to assure that life plans can be
chosen from the widest possible range of options, it is necessary
to have a framework of basic liberties, including the freedom of
expression and the freedom to live a private life. Such rights

30. Id. at 204.
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allow a person to choose his or her sexual, cultural, familiar or
religious life projects without fearing interference from others.
This list is not exhaustive, only exemplary. One should note that
some of Nino's analysis contains rights which are necessary
conditions for autonomy along with rights from which autonomy
can be directly derived.
The principle of personal inviolability "prohibits to impose
sacrifices and deprivations on people, against their will, that are
not to their own benefit."31 This principle, evidently of Kantian
origin, means that rights may not be withheld or taken (this is
the notion of sacrifice) from people without justification, and
that a person may not be used merely as an instrument to satisfy another's desires. It also means that consent plays an important moral role in social life, not only with respect to self-commitment and the restriction of one's rights, but also for the justification of certain basic legal institutions. 2 In that sense, the
principle of personal inviolability blocks the path to utilitarian
versions which, for all their preoccupation with the total quantity of social happiness, deny moral relevance to the separability
and independence of individuals. It also prevents all holistic
adventures such as, for example, those expressed by extreme
nationalism.
Recognition of the principle of personal inviolability implies
certain constraints in the pursuit of social ends and in the imposition of personal duties. Furthermore, it restricts the application of majority rule in the solution of social conflicts, and, instead, indicates that there are certain areas which the legal
system must protect; where an individual's rights "trump" - to
use Dworkin's expression - those of fellow citizens or concerns
of the State.
The principle of personal dignity "prescribes that persons
must be treated according to their own decisions, intentions or
expressions of consent."" This principle precludes evaluation of
people's actions on the basis of personal characteristics like race
or religious belief, and requires that we pay special attention to

31. Id. at 239.
32. This is especially clear with respect to punishment. See Carlos Nino, A
Consensual Theory of Punishment, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 289 (1983).
33. ETICA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, supra note 7, at 287.
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consent-based institutions when designing social structures.
Naturally, this principle excludes all determinist theories concerning the justification of conduct.
Although there may be a certain primacy to placing the
principle of personal dignity over the other two principles, the
relationship between the three principles, according to Nino, is
not lexicographical. The relationship between the principles of
autonomy and dignity, for example, is not easily determined. On
the one hand, the principle of autonomy seems to imply one of
dignity, since what makes an action morally relevant is that it is
part of someone's life plan. On the other hand, it appears that
the principle of autonomy presupposes the principle of dignity
because evaluating the adoption of certain life plans implies that
there are at least some decisions and actions to be imputed to
individuals. The principle of personal dignity restricts autonomy
among those for whom the restriction is voluntary and the maximization of autonomy for one implies an unjustifiable sacrifice
for another. It is important to note this uncertain relationship
when evaluating the principles of autonomy and dignity.
Merely stating these moral principles, from whose combination it is possible to justifiably infer human rights, does not
solve all problems. We still need to define the scope of those
rights and solutions to address conflict among the rights. Nino
explores these issues in some detail through his discussions of
actions, omissions and positive and negative duties.'
Nino's thesis calls for a kind of egalitarian liberalism. Unlike conservative liberalism, Nino's form of liberalism does not
allow people, through the justification of omissions, to be used as
the means to satisfy someone else's life plan. On the other hand,
the moral principles from which human rights are derived imply
that people are mutually independent, separate moral beings.
This implication excludes a certain type of holistic liberalism,
conceiving autonomy as a gradual property of groups of people,
that is bent on justifying the instrumentalization of others
through omission:
[Egalitarian liberalism] does not consist in maximizing global
autonomy nor in leaving untouched the autonomy everyone

34. See generally id. at ch. VIII.
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(erroneously) seems to have gained for himself; instead, it
consists in maximizing the autonomy of every single individual, as long as this does not put other individuals in a situation of comparatively lesser autonomy. This implies the directive to always expand the autonomy of those whose capacity
to choose and implement life plans is more restricted. 5
This position explains - and provides some criteria for
determining - the duties linked to the satisfaction of human
rights, especially with respect to the State. Its task is to expand
the autonomy of some without unjustifiably restricting the autonomy of others. This implies not only the guarantee of certain
rights through the prohibition of specific actions" in compliance with negative duties, it also means that the goods necessary for the exercise of those rights must be provided.3" Viewed
from this perspective, there are no second or third generation
human rights (some are even talking of a fifth generation), but
rather the same rights satisfied either by omission or commission.
Since human rights can be violated by action as well as by
omission, we need to address the question of what should be
done when those rights are violated. This question was especially important to Nino for two reasons. First, from 1976 to 1983,
Argentina experienced the most brutal military dictatorship in
her history; the most appalling and cruel consequence was that
thousands of people were exiled, kidnapped, tortured and killed.
The National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons, in
its report entitled Nunca mds (Never again), chronicled this
historic nightmare. Carlos Nino lived through this reality and
felt that one could not write about human rights without trying
to determine how these atrocities become possible. Second, during the Alfonsin administration (a democratic regime which
followed a military dictatorship) Nino held important posts such
as presidential advisor. The government he worked for had been
elected precisely for its campaign promise to bring morality back
to Argentinean social life and to punish those responsible for

35. Id. at 344-45.
36. For example, the right to life is guaranteed by the prohibition against killing.
37. In complying with positive duties, it would not make sense to guarantee
the right to life if the necessary medical and pharmaceutical services were not provided.
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human rights abuses.
A society based on liberal principles must design its institutions so as to make them compatible with the effective implementation of human rights. The institutions of criminal law
must be especially sensitive in this respect. For example, Nino
argued that the principle of autonomy has serious implications
for the regulation of criminal responsibility."
Using Nino's principle of autonomy, we can infer the prohibition of actions that infringe upon the autonomy of others or
their capacity to choose and realize plans of life, either directly
-

e.g., by killing, injuring or raping -

or indirectly, through

aggression against institutions fostering autonomy, as in the
case of fraud or tax evasion. We can also infer permission to
impose penalties that lead to an increase in autonomy. This is
what prima facie justifies punishment. A penalty reduces the
autonomy of the person to whom it applies,
but if it can be shown that the effects of the threat as well as
the application (necessary to make the threat effective) of
punishment lead to the preservation of greater autonomy,
then the value of autonomy provides a reason for imposing
such punishment. On the other hand, this same reason implies that the possibility of prescribing and applying penalties
reaches its limit where it results in a net decrease of autonomy available in society as a whole. These considerations lead
to the principle of what I have called 'prudential protection of
society.'39
Since punishment is a harm, each imposition of punishment
produces harm in the respective society. According to Nino, justifying punishment requires satisfaction of the same three criteria
that justify declaring a state of emergency: (1) the evil intended
to be prevented must be greater than the one produced; (2) the
penalty must actually be able to produce this effect; and (3) it
must be necessary, i.e., there must be no other more efficient
means to bring about the desired effect.
38. See LOS LiMITEs DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD PENAL, supra note 3; La
derivaci6n de los principios de responsabilidad penal de los fundamentos de los
derechos humanos, 12 DocTRiNA PENAL 29 (1989) [hereinafter La Derivaci6n]; Los

fundamentos de la legitima defensa. Redplica al profesor Fletcher, 2 DOCTRINA PENAL
235 (1979).
39. La Derivaci6n, supra note 38, at 37-8.
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If imposition of a penalty always produces a harm, then the
penalty may only be imposed for those actions that cause a
harm or risk that the law explicitly intends to prevent. Nino
called this restriction the "principle of enantiotelity." In addition,
moral discourse further limits a states punitive action when it
recognizes the value of individual ideals of excellence. Only
those actions performed by agents, other than the persons
harmed or endangered, that harm or endanger goods or rights
derived from moral principles may be punished. Nino calls this
restriction the "principle of inter-subjectivity of criminal law."
There are cases of justified paternalism where the State
may intervene in order to prevent an agent from carrying out an
action that would harm himself on the ground that the agent is
basically incompetent.' Such measures of legitimate paternalism are exceptions to the principle of inter-subjectivity of
criminal law.
The principles of personal autonomy and personal inviolability prescribe that individuals can acquire rights and obligations
through consent. Such consent does not necessarily have to be
given verbally, and its scope depends on the context in which it
is given. But consent does require that the person who has performed the voluntary act (marriage, contract, etc.) know and
assume the normative consequences of her action. Nino holds
that these conditions must be fulfilled if the imposition of a
penalty is to be justified.
Delinquents must comprehend the normative consequences
of their action, i.e., they must know that they are assuming a
criminal responsibility in the moment of committing a crime:
This gives rise to a principle we can call the principle of 'assumption of the penalty' which holds that it is justified to
apply a penalty to an individual if he has agreed to assume
the respective criminal responsibility through a voluntary act
carried out with the knowledge that this liability is its immediate normative consequence.4 1

40. On the notion of "basic incompetence," see Ernesto Garz6n Valdds, On Justifying Legal Paternalism, 3 RATIO JURIS 173 (1990).
41. La Derivaci6n, supra note 38, at 45.
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These two principles - prudential protection of society and
its complement, assumption of the penalty - make it possible to
justify a certain type of criminal law in a liberal society. The
following theory creates the consent-based framework Nino proposes for the justification of criminal law:
[W]hile justifications derive from the principle of social protection (more specifically, that of enantiotelity) and, in the
last instance, from the idea of autonomy, excuses derive from
the principle of assumption of the penalty and from the idea
of personal inviolability. Excuses, like defects of contract,
exclude consent. This is obvious in the cases of error or compulsion where the agent does not have the desires or beliefs
necessary to ascribe to him to have agreed to assume criminal responsibility.4 2
Nino himself recognized that there are some types of crimes
for which the preventive character of punishment works only
indirectly. Therefore, prevention depends on a number of factors,
such as social ideology or the institutional context. A typical case
is that of massive human rights violations. One must view
Nino's writings on justified punishment' for those who commit
human rights violations in light of his general conception of
criminal law and the function of punishment.
This conception is incompatible with a retributivist justification of punishment. Nino believed that retributivism is intuitively implausible because the sum of two evils - that generated by
the act of delinquency, and that of the imposition of the penalty
- cannot produce a good. If the retributivist theses and the
notion of just deserts inherent to them are accepted, then without doubt all agents of human rights violations should be punished. But Nino does not accept them, and from his consensual
justification of punishment we cannot infer the obligation to
punish all those guilty of such violations. In his own words:
[A]lmost all approaches to punishment, with the exception of
the retributivist mandate, deny that anyone has a right that
someone else be punished for a previous crime. To punish

42.
43.
Duty to
na, 100

Id. at 47.
See generally The Human Rights Policy, supra note 9; Carlos Nino, The
Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put Into Context: The Case of ArgentiYALE L.J. 2619 (1991) [hereinafter The Duty to Punish].
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those who have renounced their right not to be punished does
not result from the recognition that the victims or their relatives have a right to this punishment. It is the consequence
of a collective goal imposed by the policy to protect human
rights in the future. Therefore, nobody can claim to universalize this punishment to other similar cases when the goal
of the punishment will not be satisfied."
Punishment thus appears to be of an entirely instrumental
nature. It is a means for reaching certain social ends. Therefore,
it is justified to punish some criminals and not others. One only
has to show that the criterion of selection is capable of leading
to the pursued end precisely through the imposition of the penalty:
This does not mean that the selection may be totally arbitrary, or that one may proceed according to impermissible
criteria such as the race of the accused. The selection must be
made on the basis of its usefulness for reaching the pursued
objectives within a generally permitted criterion.'
Thus, according to Nino, the policy adopted by the Alfonsin
administration can be legitimized with respect to the legal prosecution of the Argentinean military for human rights abuses. A
closer look at Nino's philosophy will reveal the socio-political
context at the time of Alfonsin's inauguration as President of the
Republic of Argentina. During the campaign preceding the elections of October 30, 1983, Alfonsin and his followers of the Radical Party developed their human rights policy according to five
points: (1) Human rights are moral rights every human being
possesses, independent of such contingencies as sex, religion or
nationality, and of whether or not they are recognized by the
government; (2) the function of these rights is to prevent people
from being used to satisfy the ends of other people, corporate
entities, or the government; (3) human rights can be violated by
actions as well as omissions; (4) the basic justification of a political organization is the promotion of human rights, and a government is morally illegitimate if its actions are not directed towards attaining this end; and (5) the protection of human rights

44. The Duty to Punish, at 2621.
45. Id.
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concerns the government as well as civil society.'
On the basis of these considerations, the Alfonsin administration designed a double human rights policy, heavily influenced by Nino's philosophy. The administration also enacted a
number of laws aimed at protecting and preventing the violation
of human rights in the future. To address past abuses, the administration devised a strategy aimed at punishing some of
those responsible.4 7 This latter aspect of the radical
government's design has theoretical implications which lend
themselves to a better understanding of Nino's ideas.
The second aspect of the policy was itself divided into two
parts. The first was the creation of a fact-finding commission to
investigate what had actually happened; the result of this investigation was the report, Nunca mds, discussed supra. The second
was aimed at encouraging the competent organs to try, and
possibly convict, some of those responsible for past human rights
violations. According to Nino, the implementation of this idea
faced formidable obstacles of very different kinds. Firstly, only
the governing Radical Party supported it. The Peronists,'
through their presidential candidate, Italo Luder, affirmed that
there could be no prosecution of those responsible due to the law
of self-amnesty enacted by the military government. The left
wing party as well as social movements like the Mothers of the
Plaza de Mayo had adopted maximalist positions.4 9 Secondly,
there was a strong corporative cohesion in the military sector
which exerted substantial pressure on the Alfonsin administration, supported the factual non-compliance with judicial orders,
and attempted several coups d'dtat.5 ° Thirdly, there was an unprecedented economic crisis culminating in a long period of hy-

46. Transition to Democracy, supra note 9, at 218.
47. For an analysis of this strategy, compare The Duty to Punish, supra note
43, at 2619, with The Human Rights Policy, supra note 9, at 217. Alfonsin and his
government distinguished three levels of responsibility for the violation of human
rights during the military dictatorship. The distinction was made between those who
designed the plan for these abuses, those who gave the orders, and those who carried them out.
48. The Peronists were the main opposition party.
49. The Duty to Punish, supra note 43, at 2622, 2634. In Congress, Peronists
did vote for a number of laws in favor of human rights and the punishment of the
military, but in Nino's opinion, this was due to manifest political opportunism.
50. Transition to Democracy, supra note 9, at 137.
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perinflation.5 ' Lastly, there was a network of legal provisions
which, strikingly, included a law of self-amnesty issued by the
last military junta and an exemption that recognized superior
orders of the Argentinean code of military justice.2
These circumstances had enormous influence on the policy
of Alfonsin's government, and in Nino's opinion, its unparalleled
success (especially in Latin America) in punishing human rights
violations. The government solved the problem of self-amnesty
through a disposition declaring it void ab initio. This implied a
clear change in its position on the validity of de facto laws, discussed infra. Furthermore, the enactment of Law 23.049 modified the scope of the exemption allowing amnesty for those acting in compliance with superior orders. Again, one can see the
practical influence of Nino's theoretical postulates.
Several members of the military sector were tried and convicted. Those who had violated human rights in compliance of
orders were acquitted. The government, however, produced more
erratic results 3 when determining the fate of high-ranking officers who could not defend on the ground of compliance with
superior orders but who had not participated in designing the
plan of repression. Nino justifies this result for two reasons.
Firstly, it is unnecessary to diminish a society's existing global
autonomy by imposing punishments which are above and beyond
the minimum required to promote deterrence. Thus, it was sufficient to punish a few members of the military to publish the
enforcement of the sanctions." Secondly, the eagerness to impose responsibilities had to be weighed against the need to protect the democratic system itself; a necessity for prosecuting
some of the implicated soldiers. A general trial of all those who
committed human rights abuses could have caused a successful
coup d'dtat5 5
In summary, according to Nino, the following measures
should be taken with respect to human rights violations: (1) Any

51. Id. at 139.
52. The Human Rights Policy, supra note 9, at 224.
53. The results were generally favorable to the military.
54. If the military had been convinced that the Alfonsin administration intended to prosecute only a limited number of their comrades, they would have lost their
fear of a general trial for all its members and might possibly have agreed to a trial
for only those few. See, The Duty to Punish, supra note 43, at 2632.
55. Id. at 2630.
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State action should be aimed at the promotion and effective
implementation of human rights; (2) no one can invoke a right to
have all those who commit human rights abuses punished - it
is enough to punish only some of them, as long as three conditions are met: (a) The discrimination between those who are
tried and those who are not is not arbitrary; (b) the number
accused is not greater than that absolutely necessary for punishment to serve as a deterrence; and (c) the prosecution of the
delinquents is weighed against the protection and preservation
of the democratic order. In all cases, this is the most important
condition.
The Alfonsin government was legitimized by following these
criteria:
The formation of a social conscience against human rights
abuses depends more on the exposition of the atrocities and
their unmistakable condemnation than on the number of persons actually punished for them. Therefore, one of the justifications of the measures taken by the government of Alfonsin
in order to limit the number of trials was to make the punishment of the main offenders possible .. .
IV. THE LAW

The basic premise underlying Nino's understanding of the
law presumes that there is no necessary connection between
words and reality. For Nino, word meanings are purely conventional. Nino applied this concept to its furthest logical extension.
He believed that there is no true definition or single concept of
law. He subscribed to this notion in his early publications, 7 but
treated it more extensively in one of his last, posthumously
published works.5 8 This radical perspective has far-reaching
consequences for the task of the legal philosopher. If one agrees
that there is a multitude of legal concepts, each could be evaluated in view of the purposes or necessities of the respective
context in which it is applied. Furthermore, adoption of Nino's
56. Id.
57. See,
CARLOS NINO,
58. See
FUNDAmENTOS

e.g., CARLOS NINO, NO'rAS DE INTRODUCCI6N AL DERECHO (1973);
LOS CONCEPTOS DE DERECHO (1981).
CARLOS NINO, DERECHO, MORAL Y POLTICA (1994). See also
DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL, supra note 4, at 37.
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concept of law terminates many ill-conceived discussions about
the alleged essence of law, thus clearing the path for analyzing
substantive questions. Lastly, Nino's theory links the task of
theoretical elucidation with the substantive problem to be treated in each instance. According to Nino, in formulating a concept,
the theorist should proceed as follows: First, start the analysis
with pre-theoretical, approximate concepts. Second, the theorist
should use these concepts to initiate discussion of the justificatory aspects of the problem and to determine which properties are
relevant for a presumably adequate substantive theory. Third,
the theorist should check the performance of the concepts subsequently found in the context of that theory, especially with respect to relevant properties. If necessary, the theorist should
adjust the concept and then proceed to critically analyze the substantive principles of the theory. This process should be repeated
as a dialectic process of mutual adjustments of substantive and
conceptual aspects.
Different concepts of law are used in different contexts.
Consequently, there are a multitude of definitions of law, each
critical of the others because each operates in a different context.59 Nino often discussed the following possible concepts of
law:
1)

The realist descriptive concept of law refers to the set of
standards recognized as de facto by those who have the
capacity, through their decisions in concrete cases, to
mobilize the machinery that has the quasi-monopoly on
the use of force in a society. Alf Ross is said to have
been a proponent of this concept.

2)

The systemic descriptive concept of law refers to the set
of standards identified by the former criterion, plus the
standards which are their logical consequence. Nino
attributed this concept to Carlos Alchourr6n and
Eugenio Bulygin.

3)

The institutional descriptive concept of law is more restricted than the former; it refers only to the standards
de facto recognized by the primary state organs because

59. This was probably the reason a perplexed Flaubert muttered, "[l3aw: unknown entity." MANUEL ATIENZA, INTRODUCCION AL DERECHO 3 (1985) (quoting
GUSTAVE FLAUBERT, DICTIONNARE DES IDEES RE(CUES).
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these standards were dictated by certain authorities or
sources. It no longer denotes all the standards recognized by judges and other primary state organs, but
only those originating from an authoritative source such
as the legislature, precedent, etc. H.L.A. Hart used this
concept.
4)

The de lege ferenda concept of law refers to the set of all
standards that should be recognized in the quasi-monopoly of the use of force. This concept refers to an
"ought," as all normative concepts do. Naturally, this
element of "ought" cannot be strictly legal, and it therefore cannot be denoted by the concept itself. This would
be self-referring. According to Nino, sometimes the term
"valid" is used to describe a standard that is obligatory
or binding.

5)

The wide judicial normative concept of law refers to
standards which judges must take into account in their
decisions. This concept is more restricted than the last,
because it excludes standards that the legislator should,
but has yet to, enact.

6)

The restrictedjudicial normative concept of law denotes
those standards that the primary organs should recognize because they have been established by some authoritative source. According to Nino, this concept is
probably the most widely used in justificatory contexts
by judges and lawyers.
The mixed normative concept of law refers to the de
facto standards recognized by the primary state organs
in their decisions as well as to the standards the primary organs should recognize as the best justification for
the recognition of the decision-based standards. Nino
believed that this is the approach defended by Ronald
Dworkin in his interpretative theory of law.

7)

8)

The hypothetical normative concept of law refers to
those standards which hypothetically should be recognized and which are, therefore, hypothetically valid.
This implies that the standards should hypothetically
be applied in the use of the quasi-monopoly of force in a
society when they have been issued by an authoritative
source. Kelsen defended this characterization with the
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help of his hypothetical Grundnorm.

Nino stressed the importance of recognizing that the different concepts of legal norms formulated by legal philosophers do
not strictly correspond to the different concepts of law mentioned
above. Actually, only the normative concepts of law seem to refer
to norms, understood as deontological propositions, because
these concepts assume that the prescriptive behavior be carried
out. But it is not clear whether this also applies to the descriptive concepts of law since they refer to the existence of norms
only insofar as they are social texts or practices.
According to Nino, if one accepts this diversity of concepts
and takes into account that there are different kinds of legal discourse which pursue different objectives, then the traditional
debate between advocates of natural law and of legal positivism
dissolves. This is because the discussion is understood from the
perspective of conceptual essentialism and not, as has often been
proposed, from that of a disagreement between moral
objectivism and ethical skepticism. Consequently, the classic
legal philosophic questions about the conceptual relation between law and morality should not be answered a priori, since
the answer will depend on the context of discourse from which
the question is posed. The only question remaining then becomes which of these concepts is the most adequate for each of
the different contexts.
Nino believed it is more appropriate that external observers
use descriptive concepts of law and internal observers use normative concepts of law. This seems to coincide with H.L.A.
Hart's distinction between the external and internal points of
view. Although Nino himself distinguished his position from that
of Hart,' his writings suggest that those differences gradually
dissolve. Nino maintained that there is a logical connection between the internal and external points of view, because there
can be no adequate external observation without presupposing
the internal point of view. Nino theorized that,
the internal perspective is inseparably connected with the

60. See, e.g., Carlos Nino, El Concepto de Derecho en Hart, in LIBRO DE
HOMENAJE A H.L.A. HART (1987); Carlos Nino, Las Limitaciones de la Teoria de
Hart Sobre Las Normas Jurfdicas, 5 ANUARIO DE FILOSOFIA JURIDICA Y SOCIAL 1985;
DERECHO, MORAL Y POLiTICA, supra note 58.
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internal perspective of that morality, and especially the internal perspective of the discursive practice, which modernity
has linked with positive morality. If that is true, then the
external perspective of law as a social practice is distorted if
it does not, in its explications, connect this social practice to
the social practice of moral discourse.6'
This is why the law, in its justificatory sense, cannot be
identified from the position of an external observer. According to
Nino, even a legal anthropologist undertaking the identification
of certain regularities in the prescriptions utilized by the primary organs of a particular society would, in addition, need to
know which organs to consider as legitimized. These organs'
issuing prescriptions may be considered legitimate by some
other normative propositions. Therefore, the institutional descriptive concept of law cannot be used indefinitely and
recursively to qualify as legal norms those norms used by judges
to justify their decisions. If that were the case, the justificatory
reasoning of judges would be invalid. It is possible that a judge
may accept a norm because a competent authority has enacted it
by relying on other norms, and that those norms are accepted
for the same reason. But this reasoning cannot guide us ad
infinitum. Because it is impossible to infer normative justifications from facts, we cannot break the chain at some point and
accept some norm - the basic norm of the system - simply because it has been enacted by a certain authority. In Nino's opinion, therefore, the last criterion for the identification of the law
must refer to non-legal norms. These are moral norms, i.e.,
norms accepted on their own merit.
This understanding and identification of the law manifests
itself in Nino's interpretations of both Hans Kelsen's62 and Alf
Ross' works.63 In all of these studies, Nino emphasizes that the
law cannot offer autonomous reasons for the justification of
actions and decisions, rather it can only offer auxiliary reasons.

61. DERECHO, MORAL Y POLrTICA, supra note 58.
62. See Carlos Nino, Some Confusions around Kelsen's Concept of Validity, 64
ARCHlV FfIR REcHTs UND- SOZiALPHILOSOPHIE 357 (1978); LA VALIDEZ DEL DERECHO,

supra note 6.
63. See Carlos Nino, La Concepci6n de Alf Ross Sobre Los Juicios de Justicia, 3
ANUARiO DE FILOSOFiA JURiDICA Y SociAL (1983); Carlos Nino, Ross y la Reforma
del Procedimiento de Reforma Constitucional, 25 REVISTA DE CIENCIAS SOCIALEs 347
(1984); LA VALIDEZ DEL DERECHO, supra note 6.
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Morality alone provides this justificatory basis.
In asking whether the law justifies actions, one must first
define the concept of reason. Two types of reasons are relevant
in this context. The first refers to an actor's mental state that
drives a particular action. These mental states are identified
with motives. The second type serves to evaluate rather than
explain an action. Nino, following Joseph Raz's reasoning, suggests that in order to adequately reconstruct the concept and
function of justificatory reasons, one must start from practical
reasoning." This is because practical reasons serve as premises
upon which one may develop arguments to justify an action. 5
Practical reasoning leads to many different questions and understandings. Nino's interest, however, lies in a logical inference
that permits evaluation, foundation or guidance of an action.
And, obviously, an argument can help to evaluate, found or
guide an action only if its conclusion is a normative or value
judgment, i.e., to say it in a more obscure, but also more
suggestive way, a judgment the formulation of which is not
compatible with just any action or attitude of the person
uttering it.6
If the argument is in the form of an inference, and its conclusion is an "ought" judgment, then at least one of the premises
must also be an "ought" judgment. In following the proposals of
Raz, Nino distinguishes between complete reasons, operative
reasons, and auxiliary reasons; this is because common usage
deems any premise of a practical argument a reason. Complete
reasons consist of the set of all premises that are not superfluous in a valid practical argument. Operative reasons are "ought"
premises that, by themselves, could be complete reasons for an
action. Auxiliary reasons are premises consisting of empirical
judgments which define the means for satisfying operative reasons.
Operative reasons have implicit assumptions: An autonomous nature, and the generality, universality and supervenience
of the judgments serving as operative reasons. Finally, justificatory operative reasons can be ranked. The ultimate reason is

64. LA VALIDEZ DEL DERECHO, supra note 6, at 129.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 130.
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moral.
This is the principle of unity of practical reasoning that prevents the inability to decide on actions which are guided by a
plurality of reasons. This is the integrative characteristic of
reasons, since it consists in the property of grouping together
in a system, maintaining some sort of hierarchical order.67
What is the role of the law in practical reasoning? Nino
forwards the following example: Suppose that the reasoning of a
judge has the following elements: (1) A democratically elected
legislator should be obeyed; (2) legislator L has been democratically elected; (3) L has enacted a norm prescribing "The killing
of another person will be punished by 8 years in prison"; (4)
those who kill someone should be punished; (5) John has killed
Peter; and (6) John should be punished with 8 years of prison.
According to Nino's analysis, this reasoning fulfills the following
functions:
a) (1) is, in the broadest sense, a moral judgment and cannot be identified with a legal norm.
b) (3) is a descriptive judgment that mentions a legal norm
and constitutes an auxiliary reason.
c) The conclusion in (6) must be of the same kind of normative judgment as the operative reason. It is a moral judgment
because it is inferred from (1) (a moral judgment) and from (3)
which describes the existence of a legal norm. Nino calls this
arrangement of sentences, "judgments of normative adhesion."
"Since this kind of sentence is the justificatory legal judgment
par excellence, this confirms the conclusion advanced above that
practical legal propositions are a kind of moral judgment.""
d) The question is whether (3) can - independent of (1) be a justificatory operative reason. The answer is no because it
is a judgment of a descriptive nature and whoever invokes it for
justificatory purposes commits the naturalistic fallacy.69

67. Id. at 133.
68. Id. at 140.
69. See Carlos Nino, Respuesta a J.J. Moreso, P.E. Navarro y M.C. Redondo, 10
DOXA 261 (1993).
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e) (4) appears in the argument as an intermediate conclusion and constitutes a judgment of adhesion. If a judge assumes
(4) as a justificatory operative reason, he does not observe a
legal norm but rather considers it a moral norm. The judge's
argument becomes a moral one instead of a practical legal argument.
f) If, instead, a judge assumes (4) because the legislator L
commands as much, he assumes it as a judgment of adhesion.
Thus, it follows that the judge, in effecting compliance with a
norm, invoke reasons different than those held by L when he
enacted the norm. The judge performs a practical legal argument insofar as he does not argue like a legislator.
From all this, Nino concludes, "legal norms do not express
autonomous operative reasons for the justification of decisions
unless they are identified with moral judgments... they do not
by themselves express operative reasons for action." 0
Nino's concept of law influences his view of the activity
performed by legal theorists and his characterization of legal
dogma.71 Traditional legal dogma assumes certain preconditions
which any scientific activity should satisfy. Legal dogma is characterized as scientific depending on whether jurists' actions
satisfy these conditions. The assumptions of legal dogma and the
perception dogmatists have of their own work can be explained
historically as well as ideologically.7 2
At least since codification, it is commonly known that dogmatists believe that their function is not to evaluate the law but
to contribute to its systematization. Strangely enough, Nino
explains that "these assumptions of dogmatic jurists about their
own activity have little to do with reality. What legal dogma
intends is a genuine reconstruction of the positive system, in
order to eliminate its indeterminacies as well as to adjust it to
certain underlying axiological ideals."73

70.

LA VALIDEZ DEL DERECHO, supra note 6, at 143.

71. See CARLOS NINO, CONSIDERACIONES SOBRE LA DOGMATICA JURiDICA (1974);
CARLOS NINO, ALGUNOs MODELOS METODOLOGICOS DE "CIENCIA" JURiDICA (1993).

72. For an analysis of those explanations, assumptions of legal dogmatics and
the functions they fulfill, see ALBERTO CALSAMIGLIA, INTRODUCCION A LA CIENCIA
JURiDICA (1986).
73. ALGUNOS MODELOS METODOLOGICOS DE "CIENCIA" JURiDICA, supra note 71,
at 17.
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So-called legal theories (e.g., the general theory of crime) not
only function descriptively but also normatively. This is because
they give justificatory support to the positive law and, at the
same time, offer solutions for those cases not yet solved by the
same law they claim not to evaluate. One can clearly see the
normative function jurists fulfill by observing jurists as they
interpret norms. In giving meaning to legislated measures, jurists clearly display moral and ideological preferences (especially, but not exclusively, in constitutional interpretation), disguised under an alleged scientist's coat as methods of interpretation.
Nino was dissatisfied with the traditional model of legal
dogma that purports to describe an activity legal scholars do not
perform, while covering up the one they actually carry out. He
called for a reconstruction of legal dogma that would satisfy the
demand for showing how jurists work and what functions they
serve. Consequently, Nino proposed a model of law as a normative science.
His proposal attempts to answer two questions. The first
asks why legal theorists should discuss the values they forward
and which values are necessary for the reformulation of positive
legal norms. The second asks what general lines should the
theoretical elaborations of legal dogmatists follow. The first is
the more important question. According to Nino, the first function of the theorist is to offer guidelines for the administration of
justice by offering models for the "sentence ferenda." But since
the interpretation and application of the law performed by judges necessarily depends on axiological questions, theorists must
also take those into account if they want to formulate guidelines
for the administration of justice.
Nino theorized that the axiological implications of the function of judges are observed in the following ways. First, judges
must give meaning to legal provisions. Those analyzing these
interpretations should be critical of using the ordinary meanings
ascribed by common usage because, in many cases, the legislature uses words in a technical sense. Moreover, if jurists are
interpreting old provisions literally, they may give them a different effect than that intended by the law. "In order to transform
the 'rule of common usage' from a practical guide to infer what
meaning should necessarily be assigned to the words of the law,
one must take recourse to axiological or pragmatic consider-

1995]

CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO

ations."74
Second, the legal system may be severely underdetermined.
This can be due to pragmatic, semantic, syntactic or logical
factors. The use of certain mechanisms to solve those
indeterminacies shows a clear normative tendency even if it is
descriptively disguised as in the case of so-called "legal nature":
The legal order, in short, is not in fact a self-sufficient system
for the resolution of any conceivable case. And since it is
impossible to give a definite solution to unforeseen cases only
with the help of axiologically neutral techniques of interpretation and systemic reconstruction, judges are compelled to
solve such cases by invoking, at some point of their arguments, non-legal principles and rules.7"
Third, as I have already discussed, the law, according to
Nino, does not offer justificatory reasons but only auxiliary ones.
Therefore, in order to justify a decision, one must always refer to
evaluative criteria of a moral nature. When handing down a
sentence, a judge cannot suspend her moral responsibility by
saying that her decision is justified because the law says so. She
must presuppose (and make explicit) the axiological assumptions
that make compliance with this norm legitimate.
However, just as judges must rely on values to justify their
decisions, legal scholars must abandon their evaluative inhibitions if they want to offer "sententia ferenda" (that is, recommendations about what judicial decisions ought to be made). According to Nino, if it is true that legal theorists do fulfill this
socially important function, then the question remaining is how.
He suggested a two-level approach. On the first level, the justification of the legal system, its basic institutions, and the effective
legal practices should be evaluated.
Problems like the division of power, the justification of punishment, the relevance of agreements between private persons,
and the inheritance system are some of the questions analyzed
on this level. The purpose here is to offer guidelines de lege
ferenda to both justify legal norms and to suggest ways for their
modification. On the second level, the activity of the jurist is

74. Id. at 93.
75. Id. at 94.
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viewed as eminently normative. The task here is to try to reconstruct the system, eliminating its indeterminacies with the help
of open (as opposed to traditional dogma's secret) evaluative
directives:
Organs of application that are conscious of the fact that their
work inevitably implies taking a stance on fundamental
axiological questions will find extremely valuable orientation
in theoretical elaborations constructed along those lines ....
[I]f they have at their disposition different theoretical approaches developed explicitly from different basic value conceptions, showing their implications for specific questions and
the forms in which positive norms can be interpreted and
applied in order to adjust them to the necessities of those
conceptions, judges will have an invaluable source to live up
to their responsibility of reaching morally justifiable decisions
with a clear mind and good judgment."
V. DEMOCRACY
While it is true that Carlos Nino's conception of human
rights is that they are of a basic and central moral nature, he
also postulates that their recognition in legal theory and practice
must be considered a precondition for the justification of legal
norms and decisions. This is why he claims that "it is the function of effectively guaranteeing basic individual rights that provides the primary moral justification for the existence of any
legal order or government."7 7
Thus, the set of moral principles reviewed above gives moral
justification to the legal order; to the existence of authorities
capable of issuing norms and implementing them through the
apparatus that holds a quasi-monopoly on the use of force in a
society. This concept lead Nino to dedicate a substantial portion
of his efforts to find a solution to two questions: The first is the
determination of what type of government is least likely to dictate ethically unacceptable norms and whether or not there is an
obligation to obey the unethical law; the second question is how
to solve the apparent paradox regarding the moral irrelevance of

76. Id. at 108.
77. ETICA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, supra note 7, at 368.
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law and government.
Obviously, the answer to the first question is democracy.
Following the standard conception, Nino defines democracy as a
system of decision-making through majority rule, either directly
or through periodically elected representatives. This definition
does not answer the question of why democracy is justified. Nino
rejects several theories that attempt to justify democracy: democracy as an expression of popular sovereignty; democracy as
government based on the consent of the governed; democracy as
government based on contractualist assumptions; and
consequentialist theories of democracy. In his opinion, democracy is justified because it is a surrogate of moral discourse.
Utilizing as a point of departure William Nelson's observation that democracy is a form of government that tends to produce morally acceptable laws due to the tests laws must pass
before enactment, Nino sets out to broaden this idea by profoundly emphasizing the relation between democracy and public
debate. Prior to Nino, Stanley Benn and Richard Peters emphasized that democracy operates in an atmosphere of discussion,
and the rules of the political game underlying democracy are
intended precisely to facilitate and guarantee political dialogue
and debate among all members of the community.
According to Nino, the rules of democracy prescribe the
following: no discrimination on grounds of race, sex, or economic
means; the votes of all citizens hold equal weight; collective
political decisions are to be made by majority rule; representatives are to be elected periodically; and minority rights may not
be violated. These are all examples of rules that create a decision-making procedure which is similar to the procedure in moral discourse. Respecting the rules of democracy enables citizens
to enter into an active dialogue on an equal basis, in the absence
of pressures and coercion, either directly or through representatives.78 This active dialogue is aimed at reaching a politically
correct decision. Thus, following majority rule provides the most
practical formula for moral consensus.
However, Nino recognized that the rules of democratic procedure, although similar, are not identical to those of moral
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discourse. First, democratic decisions must be reached within a
certain time frame otherwise they constitute implicit decision.
This temporally limits deliberation. Moral discourse, on the
other hand, operates free from time constraints. Second, majority rule's acceptance in solving conflicts makes people strive for
unanimity even though it may be unattainable. Third, the theory of representative democracy poses problems that obscure, to a
greater extent than moral discourse, individual participation in
debate. These three deviations suggest that democratic discourse
can be viewed as "regulated" moral discourse or, in Nino's own
words, a "surrogate for moral discourse."
The justification for democratic discourse as a surrogate for
moral discourse is not only that it expands the pragmatic possibility for moral discourse, but also that it tends to be impartial.
In the interplay between the majority and minorities, individuals strive to gain converts to their own agenda. We achieve this
goal by discussing the respective merits of each position. In
addition, the process must take place in public, take into consideration all affected interests, and cannot evaluate these interests
on grounds of particularistic considerations. The need to collect
votes would thus be a strong incentive for everyone to come close
to a position of impartiality.
This approach implies that democracy acquires epistemic
value. Democracy is a good method for approaching moral truth
both because free discussion exposes fallacious arguments and
because it is improbable that an isolated person would impartially consider all affected interests. Therefore, the process of
democratic discussion has a higher probability of guiding a moral person to adhere to moral principles than if she deliberated in
isolation. Democratic procedures, however, are no guarantee
that all decisions will be morally correct. Instead, the value in
democratic procedures is that they produce a greater probability
of morally correct decisions than any other procedure.
These considerations acquire special relevance when applied
to analyzing compliance with the law. If the democratic legal
order recognizes individual rights, facilitates cooperation among
citizens and solves social conflicts impartially, then citizens have
a duty to obey the law. Besides, democracy as a surrogate of
moral discourse has an additional epistemic value which is also
important. If the conditions of democracy are satisfied, there is a
strong presumption that decisions are morally correct and
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should therefore be obeyed. It is in this context that Nino questions the correct moral attitude toward a person who feels that
her own evaluations collide with democratically established legal
norms. His response distinguishes between rights violated by
democratic legal norms that are necessary conditions for moral
discourse or its democratic surrogate and those rights that are
not. For example, disobeying democratic legal norms would be
justified in issues involving the right to life or the freedom of
expression. This conclusion can be reached by individual deliberation because "they are a priori rights with respect to the method of moral knowledge consisting in discussion and collective
decision, and they are determined through deliberation about
the conditions that give value to the latter."79
In contrast, citizens and judges have a prima facie duty to
obey, even against conscientious objection, because democratic
discussion is a better procedure for determining the moral correctness of actions. Nino argued that beliefs to the contrary
advocate a kind of individual moral hubris.
Analysis of compliance with the law must be complemented
by an examination of two social practices that have gained unprecedented relevance in the past few years: conscientious objection and civil disobedience. Nino, more reluctant to accept the
second than the first, opined that both could be justified in a
democratic regime under very special circumstances. If one disobeys a norm for reasons of conscience, and the norm, without
reason, violates the principle of individual autonomy, the conscientious objection is justified. For example, if ordered to salute
the flag or prohibited from engaging in certain sexual practices
between consenting adults, conscientious objection may be proper. Also, if the democratic procedure has been plagued by so
many mistakes that its epistemological value and its guarantee
of individual rights have become totally ineffective, civil disobedience may be justified although its justification is much more
difficult.
Nino also analyzed citizens' attitude toward the law from
the related perspective of anomy.8 ° The examination of this
problem permitted him to formulate a tentative explanation for

79. EkTICA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, supra note 7, at 406.
80. See generally UN PAlS AL MARGEN DE LA LEY, supra note 9.
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the underdevelopment and economic and social setbacks suffered
without significant interruption by the Republic of Argentina
since the beginning of this century. According to Nino, the emergence of anomy and illegal conduct in Argentina today were
evident in some characteristics of the last years of colonial life.
Disobedience against the laws dictated by local authorities and
the practice of smuggling, which was endemic at the time, are
examples. These characteristics became more prevalent at the
beginning of Argentinean independence. Nino illustrated the
disastrous consequences of these characteristics. The actual
distribution of land in Argentina followed improper interpretation, legal loopholes and later, open violation of Rivadavia's
Lease Act of 1826. The Act, in principle, was aimed at the distribution of state-owned land among immigrants, but resulted in
the distribution of 6.5 million acres of fertile land to 122 persons, ten of which received 133,000 acres each. s"
Through a summary analysis of illegal conduct, Nino presented several examples in support of his thesis. Illegal conduct
considered representative of the situation in Argentina includes
tax evasion and corruption in manufacturing. Although ignored
by politologists, sociologists and historians, Nino calls attention
to the fact that Argentinean underdevelopment cannot be understood without reference to this situation of anomy that has frustrated more than one attempt at cooperation in Argentinean
society.
Nino calls to mind problems with game theory and its connection with the inefficiency of interactions among self-interested participants; problems that make it impossible to reach the
desired ends. Nino suggested that the obvious solution depends
on the existence of norms that form a necessary condition for the
development of efficient collective action, either because they
modify the preferences of the participants, or because they ensure their expectations are realized.
The Sdenz Pefia Act of 1912 established the obligation to
vote in Argentina and is a good example of how a norm can
serve to eliminate certain obstacles to social cooperation. In
states where voting is not compulsory, self-interested and rational citizens may tend not to vote because their one vote is prac-

81. Id. at 59.
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tically insignificant compared to the total amount of votes. The
citizens believe that the utility gained by casting one vote does
not compensate for its inconveniences. Thus, if everyone were
self-interested, no one would vote, the system would break down,
and the consequences for all citizens would be irreparable.
This paradox, Nino adds, is complemented by a particular
social dynamic. There are social sectors that do not vote. In
turn, elected representatives do not promote these societal interests thus reinforcing the tendency of these sectors to abstain
from voting in future elections. The only way to overcome these
difficulties and to promote social action is to make voting compulsory. This justifies the S~enz Pefla Act. This law was intended to solve the voting paradox and tripled voter turnout. Also,
the law gave considerable weight to the popular sectors in electing authorities. According to Nino, the more immediate consequence was that the conservative sectors now rule Argentina
through the proscription of so-called popular parties or through
military coups."
In order to overcome the anomical situation in Argentina,
Nino proposed a number of institutional reforms that would
affect the structure of the State." However, these reforms
would not be sufficient unless they are accompanied by measures to facilitate education about liberal democratic values in
society. This concerns not only the promotion of education on all
levels, from elementary to post-graduate, but support for socially
acceptable behavior through the compliance with norms. This
promotes the autonomy of the people to freely make life choices,
while at the same time fostering awareness of the hardships
brought about by generalized anomy. Nino stated that,

82. Id. at 179. This leads to a new paradox. Democracy requires the vote of
the majority of citizens. The larger sectors in society have a higher probability of
seeing their interests represented in government. The negative reaction of economically more powerful though smaller sectors of society undermines the basis of democracy. In Argentina, this conflict has traditionally ended in military coups in favor of
minority interests. Also, the interests of the smaller more powerful sectors have been
promoted by governments that were elected by the masses but then moved away
from popular expectations, as is the case with the Peronist Carlos Menem. A solution creating new norms that strengthen the state in its role as an arbitrator may
encourage cooperative undertakings between the different sectors allowing those that
are unrepresented to improve their position in some way.
83. For a discussion of these reforms, see UN PAiS AL MARGEN DE LA LEY,
supra note 9, at 217-33.
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[t]he development of personal autonomy requires
intersubjective norms permitting its egalitarian expansion ....There are intersubjective norms that must necessarily be promoted and even coercively implemented if the
personal autonomy advocated by liberalism is to be realized.
One of the forms of promoting such intersubjective norms is
through the education process. It may even be true that there
can be no effective compliance with public norms without the
formation of certain virtues of character which are part of a
civic spirit. We inevitably must use the education process to
foster those virtues ....
VI. THE CONSTITUTION

If Nino's non-essentialist view of the meaning of words is
adopted, then the words "constitution" and "constitutionalism,"
like "law," can have several meanings. Nino distinguished
constitutionalism in a minimal sense from constitutionalism in
the full sense. This distinction coincides with the classical way
of understanding a constitution as both a formal piece and as a
document having important components.
Constitutionalism in a minimal sense refers to the demand
that states have a constitution to serve as the backbone of the
legal order, give structure to the organs of the State, determine
the relation between state and citizens, and limit the
competences of the legislative power.
Constitutionalism in the full sense demands that the constitution satisfy certain basic procedural and material requirements. The minimal sense of constitutionalism seems to imply
the rule of law, while constitutionalism in the full sense implies
a liberal democracy.' "Constitution" can be a notion of normative, descriptive, or mixed nature, depending on the concept of
law. The normative nature of "constitution" refers to the set of
valid principles created by the system of individual rights or to a

84. Id. at 251.
85. See FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL, supra note 4, at 2, 4. The

idea that the rule of law is compatible with any content, except State terrorism, is
not new, although some do not agree with it. In this respect, one could also speak
of a minimal and a full sense of "rule of law" where the full sense would be
identified with the idea of a democracy that respects individual rights.
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legitimate structural organization of the state and its decisionmaking procedures. "Constitution" in the descriptive sense refers
to the basic norms actually recognized by the primary organs.
Basic norms adopted through a legitimate procedure of collective
decision-making represent the notion of "constitution" of a mixed
nature. These definitions may vary depending on the specific
context and the ends they are meant to serve.
Nino was interested in finding an answer to the alleged
irrelevance of the constitution in practical reasoning. He believed that for logical reasons the existence of a legal norm did
not justify a decision or action. For example, a judge cannot
validly order that no-one may be deprived of liberty except by a
written order issued by a competent authority if the order is
arbitrarily based on an article of a constitution. If the judge,
using a descriptive concept of "constitution," describes a social
practice when she invokes this constitutional norm, then she
cannot infer a duty to issue an order releasing a detainee. In effect, the judge cannot infer any order at all because to do so
would be a naturalistic fallacy. To justify her decision, the
judge's appeal to the constitutional provision must have a normative character. She must assume that there is another norm
saying "what the constitutional authority prescribes ought to be
done." But then, she must also assume another norm, and repeat this process over and over.
Since this process may not continue ad infinitum, a norm
prescribing that a certain authority should be obeyed on its own
merit must be accepted. This norm must be a moral rather than
a legal one. A legal norm, however, must derive from a moral
norm, for the moral norm gives legitimacy to the authority that
issued the legal norm. If one accepts that a norm deriving from
a moral authority is, in turn, a moral norm, then one would
have to conclude that legal norms are a kind of moral norm.
This implies that legal discourse is a type of moral discourse in
which judges widely recognize moral norms that justify the application of legal norms derived therefrom. The judges adopt this
principle by adhering to the legal norms, which is in effect adherence to moral norms.
Moral principles already contain everything a constitution
can contain. Therefore, a constitution does not add anything to
these justificatory principles. If a constitution does not embody
moral principles, it is not legitimate and cannot be used in prac-
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tical discourse. If a constitution does recognize moral principles,
it is redundant because it appeals to the very principles of moral
discourse inherent in practical reasoning.
The apparent paradox of the legitimizing function of constitutions, however, does have a solution. The original constitution,
whether written or not, is an historical fact establishing a process that gives rise to a legal order. Not all historical constitutional attempts are successful, of course, but because of certain
characteristics that were relevant at the time, some of them do
succeed. This enables the community to coordinate its actions
around this constitutional norm. No legal operator, whether
constituent, legislator, or judge has exclusive control over this
process. They can influence it only in part. Therefore, their respective actions must be guided by an appropriate rationality.
This implies that each of the operators' actions must be aimed at
preserving and improving the legal order, unless this order is so
immoral that the legal operators have the ethical obligation to
make it inoperative.
The practice may be justified by adopting Nino's two-tiered
argument." On the first, more basic level, a constitution is legitimized by examining procedural and material considerations.
The following issues should be considered: whether the constitution is the fruit of a democratic, collective decision-making procedure; whether its promulgation was preceded by free and open
debate; whether its approval was consensual; and whether it
contains the basic individual rights that are a prerequisite for
the epistemic value of the decision-making procedure. On this
first level, morally valid principles and procedures for the constitution and constitutional law are of paramount importance.
If this first-level evaluation produces satisfactory results,
the constitution is examined at the second level to justify actions
and decisions. On this level, reasoning is constrained by the
reasons established on the first level. This implies that principles or procedures that are incompatible with the preservation
and the improvement of the constitution may not be proposed.
On this level too, moral reasoning plays a role. Because the first
level ranks higher than the second, moral principles and proce-

86. Id. at 70. See also Carlos Nino, La Constituci6n como Convenci6n, 6
REVISTA DEL CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES 189 (1990).
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dures take precedence. Moral principles and procedures are
manifest in the solution of constitutional indeterminacies, thus
permitting the enrichment of constitutional practice and its
movement in the direction of more acceptable forms of legitimacy. Summing it up in Nino's own words, this two-tier reasoning
corresponds to,
a 'second best' type of rationality because individual cases
would, by definition, be solved much better if we could justify
our actions and decisions on the basis of last principles. But
this we cannot do outside of a constitutional practice, and in
order to preserve this practice and not fall into another, or be
left without any - which, I assume, would lead to solutions
that are worse - we must resign ourselves to justifying our
actions and decisions in a way that is compatible with the
constitution we have, while at the same time trying to improve it. 7
Nino's conception of the role of the constitution and the
criteria that must be satisfied in order to justify it are also reflected in his treatment of two related topics: judicial review and
the validity of de facto laws.
A

JudicialReview

As is well known, in almost all modern democracies there
are special procedures by which certain organs - constitutional
courts, other courts, or judges in general - may examine whether or not a law conforms to the constitution. The conditions, processes and consequences of such judicial review are different,
but the common underlying idea is that judges have some sort of
veto over decisions made through democratic procedures. In
principle, this is a serious setback for democratic ideals since a
nonrepresentative organ, a judge, can constrain majority decisions.
Nino dedicated two of his papers to the formulation and the
proposal of a solution of the apparent paradox of judicial review." Nino questioned the foundation of this judicial review.

87. FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL, supra note 4, at 76.
88. See generally FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL, supra note 4, at
657; Carlos Nino, La Filosofla del Control Judicial de Constitucionalidad,4 REVISTA
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His conception of legal norms does not justify actions and decisions as binding force. The validity of legal norms does not derive from the law itself but from moral evaluations. Democracy,
on the other hand, has epistemic moral value since it is the most
trustworthy procedure for finding moral truth. Decisions are
made after free and open debate with a view toward consensus,
presupposing individual rights and satisfying the requirement of
impartiality. In this context, constitutions and legal norms have
a claim, and the highest probability, of being just. Nino believed
that allowing a judge or a court to pass judgment on the validity
of a law is tantamount to advocating a certain kind of unacceptable elitism, assuming that moral truth can be reached by individual reflection. This opinion appears to bar any possibility of
judging the value of a law that has been dictated by democratic
organs. However, Nino argues that if one proceeds with the
utmost caution, there may be several possible ways to justify
judicial review.
First, it seems clear that not all "actual democracies" satisfy
the procedural prerequisites they ideally should satisfy. Judges
do not have epistemic reasons for putting moral trust in decisions that are not respected or decisions that are considered
open violations of democratic procedures. Consequently, in judging the constitutionality of a law, it is the duty of judges to determine whether, in the elaboration and subsequent promulgation of the law in question, the steps required by democratic
discourse have been observed. If this is not the case, judges
should uphold an ideal constitution and declare that law unconstitutional. Accordingly, there is a process-based possibility to
justify judicial review.
Second, in a democracy, it is empirically possible to enact a
perfectionist law imposing behavioral patterns of personal excellence on the citizens. It is well known, however, that inter-subjective moral principles should be distinguished from ideals of
personal excellence. Only the former may be legitimately imposed by law since the epistemic value of democracy resides in
its tendency to be impartial. In contrast, ideals of personal excellence are related to and depend on the principle of personal
autonomy which is a prerequisite of democratic discourse. In
view of the two-tiered structure of constitutional reasoning, the

DEL CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES 79 (1989).
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principle of personal autonomy also takes precedence over the
final result of the discourse as a whole. Thus, there is another
form of legitimizing a declaration of unconstitutionality based on
the procedure followed by the majority if the principle of autonomy, other moral principles, or the rights deriving therefrom are
violated.
Third, Nino points out that while democracy supplies trustworthy epistemic evidence of the moral correctness of the principles and decisions which it adopts and which should be applied
to constitutional practice, it is also true that this practice is a
precondition for the continuity and efficacy of democracy.
Therefore, judges are also guarantors of this continuity and, as
such, should declare unconstitutional those laws adopted by the
majority that endanger it. A certain paradox of democracy is
thus overcome. A judge cannot, and state organs should not,
permit this structure to be subverted through democratic procedures. This yields a third way of justifying a declaration of unconstitutionality. According to Nino,
the judge should continually reexamine up to which point he
prefers the continuity of practice to its perfection; up to
which point democratic procedures are competent enough to
be trusted to determine the principles in the light of which
practice is to be perfected; in what measure this process
should be corrected and deepened; in what measure such
correction or deepening undermines the continuity of
practice; in what measure individual autonomy is violated on
the basis of a democratic decision, etc.89
This requires that judges not only act with caution, but also
surpass the most "Herculean" qualities Dworkin imagines his
Judge to possess.
B. The Validity of De Facto Laws
The doctrine according validity to legal acts issued by governments that emerged out of military coups is a problem closely
related to judicial review. This problem has had great, albeit
negative, impact in Argentinean constitutional life.

89. FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL, supra note 4, at 704.
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Quite a few writers have attributed the same legal validity
to de facto norms as to norms issued by democratic governments. Carlos Nino was troubled primarily by two questions:
What validity do de facto norms possess? And what validity do
they have once a democratic government has been established?
According to Nino, the answers to these questions have been obscured by the different meanings given to the term "validity,"
which in his terminology is identified with "binding force."
Nino distinguished between norms that are just because of
their content and norms that are just because of their origin. It
is perfectly possible for a de facto government to issue a norm
whose content is morally unobjectionable (i.e., that complies
with basic moral principles and respects individual rights). Even
though the hypothesis is empirically difficult to verify, no logical
reason prohibits imagining a benevolent dictator whose only
mission is to dictate just norms. If such a dictator does issue
such norms, they should be obeyed. If the norms are just with
respect to their content, then considerations about their origin
are superfluous. Citizens would actually satisfy the demands of
morality if they carried out the prescribed action; the fact that
this action is ordered by the law would be irrelevant.
A totally different question is whether a law issued by a de
facto government could ever be justified without invoking its
content. As Nino observed, it is likely that once power has been
usurped, the return to democracy is difficult. Disobedience
against the dictatorial laws creates more problems for order, the
security of persons, or the return to democracy than obedience,
so long as the norms are not intolerably unjust. In any case, the
recognition of laws that originate from undemocratic governments is radically inferior since the laws lack the presumption
of justice that applies to laws established through democratic
procedure. In this sense, de facto norms have,
a very low grade of prima facie validity... (just as we must
admit the idea of prima facie validity indicating the fact that
it derives from some moral reasons or principles that can be
displaced by other, higher-ranking ones, we must also accept
the idea that validity comes in different grades, depending on
the hierarchy of the principles or considerations it is based
on)0.
90. La Validez de las Normas De Facto, in LA VALIDEZ DEL DERECHO, Supra
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Despite this original weakness, norms that are just because of
their content may have higher ethical value than those deriving
from disobedience of the law. If this is so, judges should, after
careful examination, declare them valid and binding and citizens
should comply with them.
It is important to emphasize the different attitudes judges
should have toward de facto and democratic laws. With respect
to the latter, one should recognize the epistemic value added by
democratic procedure. Where problems of conscience are caused
by a clash between judges' own value judgments and the content
of the laws, judges should accept the opinion of the majority
with the aforementioned exceptions. Otherwise, they would be
guilty of moral hubris. This, however, does not apply to de facto
laws which carry no epistemic value and for which judges should
be aware of their special responsibility. Judges must carefully
examine whether these norms are just and, if they are not, they
must declare them invalid unless considerations of security and
order suggest otherwise.
This last consideration in favor of an eventual recognition of
a very low grade of validity of de facto laws is weakened even
more when a democratic government returns to power. In such a
case, citizens are bound by the de facto laws until the laws are
submitted for judicial review in actual cases. Here, it must be
added that reasons of order or security would have much less
weight, at least until the democratic parliament derogates them.
In summary, if de facto norms are just, they must be recognized as valid and judges must apply them. If the content of a
de facto norm is axiologically unsatisfactory, a judge could still
balance reasons of security and order if they would be assured of
obedience to the norm in question despite its deficits in content.
If necessary, the judge could declare the law unconstitutional.
Finally, since de facto norms do exist, albeit with a weak degree
of validity, they bind citizens until they are derogated or declared unconstitutional. In Nino's opinion, however, de facto
laws do not give rise to rights gained through public acts (e.g.,
acts to stabilize employment in the public sector) until they have
been ratified by democratic authorities.

note 6, at 101.
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VII. POLITICS

Carlos Nino was a liberal, but not a liberal in the false
sense this word is sometimes given in our latitudes: synonymous
with conservativism in politics and unlimited confidence in the
market in economic matters. Instead, he understood liberalism
as a genuine moral position squarely opposed to all totalitarian
conceptions of society. Liberalism in this sense is not a neutral
position of social morality but refers to binding moral standards
and the respect of personal ideals of excellency. The liberalism
Carlos Nino advocated is not at all skeptical, rather it is based
on a clear conception of what is socially good. In other words,
Nino sustained that the autonomy of individuals to choose and
pursue plans and styles of life is intrinsically valuable.
On the level of practical constitutional politics, this moral
liberalism is incompatible with any form of holism, perfectionism, or normative determinism. It is, however, perfectly compatible with the ideals of fraternity, equality, and democracy. This
moral liberalism even seems to imply these ideals, although
their scope should be determined through democratic discussion.
In several studies," Nino demonstrates that the practice of
moral discussion is a protoliberal institution because the requisite values and procedural rules lead to liberal principles. He of
course believed that it would be a practical inconsistency to
participate in this moral practice and at the same time refuse to
accept principles or prerequisites necessarily accepted by participating in that practice. Liberalism has been linked to the practice of the moral discourse of modernity ever since the value of
autonomy was recognized. From this general premise, the specific moral principle of autonomy that is part of the moral conception of society is derived.
In Nino's conception, the idea of autonomy implies the idea
of separability and independence of persons, and this led him to
defend a second liberal principle constraining autonomy: the
principle of individual inviolability. Still, these two principles
alone could not adequately develop a liberal society. A third
91. See, e.g., FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CONSTrrUCIONAL, supra note 4, at 163;
EL CONSTRUCTIVISMO ETICO, supra note 8, at 113-33; ETICA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS,
supra note 7, at 92.
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principle is needed: establishing that individuals may legitimately constrain their rights or acquire obligations through voluntary
acts. This is the principle of individual dignity. Together these
three principles provide a valid normative foundation for the
derivation of a broad set of individual basic rights.
For this reason any institutional design adopted on liberal
grounds must contain a provision similar to that of Article 19 of
the Argentinean Constitution, which provides that the State
may not interfere in private acts that do not harm other people
or the public order. The institutional design should guarantee a
basic catalogue of individual rights, such as life and physical
integrity, and a set of political liberties guaranteeing an equal
vote as well as the possibility to elect and be elected. There
should be provisions that guarantee private property and the
freedom to do with one's belongings as one chooses. These
norms, according to Nino, constitute the nucleus of liberalism.
If one accepts the distinction between conservative and
egalitarian liberalism, then Nino clearly tended toward the latter. Characteristically, this is perfectly compatible with the three
ideals usually viewed as opposing liberalism: fraternity, equality, and democracy. Showing the compatibility of liberalism and
the value of fraternalism is important. This not only contributes
to clarify certain forms of institutional design but also implies a
reply to some communitarian objections that point out some of
liberalism's deficits. Nino assumed that individuals need to
adhere to others, form groups and identify themselves with
others to achieve optimal development. This need is normally
satisfied through family institutions, clubs, associations, regional
communities, and the like. These groups create bonds of affection and cooperation, and the social control over their members
is usually effective. Occasionally, individuals respond even more
to the standards of social morality generated by those groups
than to general and universal principles. Liberalism must find
an answer for this problem.
Nino also accepted that attempts by central organs to solve
certain problems may create an impartiality deficit. Those who
evaluate the case are too remotely situated from those whose
situation is evaluated. Thus, the former cannot adequately anticipate what the latters' interests are. As a result, evaluators tend
to substitute excessively abstract and general conceptions for
actual interests. Here too, liberalism is challenged to provide an
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answer.
With these two fundamental challenges, Nino attempted to
show the compatibility of liberalism and the requirements of
fraternity. Actually, associations and fraternal groups are admitted by all liberal constitutions, and they must be as long as
members can come and go voluntarily. A liberal social design
must admit, and in some cases even foster, different forms of
partial unions, but they must always be voluntary and free of
holistic or perfectionist aims. This is why, for example, divorce is
a more just social institution than one that upholds the indissolubility of marriage. The possibility of fraternal unions is legitimate not only in private circles, but also in public. According to
Nino, there would be no problem in combining a certain degree
of institutional decentralization with a liberally designed society
that would permit citizens to maintain closer contact with those
public servants immediately responsible for them or with whom
they most identify. "Institutional decentralization in neighborhoods, municipalities, and regions may be required by the liberal
imperative of impartiality, because the concentration of decisions
in centers that rule over extended and general areas can distort
the consideration of affected interests."92
Note that liberalism is not only compatible with the ideal of
fraternity; according to Nino, it is also compatible with equality.
Liberalism has often been accused of ignoring the ideal of equality. In light of this tension between equality and liberty, liberalism has always underestimated the value of equality. Conversely, the value of autonomy is said to close the door to solidarity.
Liberalism's support for the market plus its defense of private
property even give it a share of responsibility for the greatest
inequalities.
However, the existence of strongly egalitarian advocates of
liberalism 3 is reason enough for Nino to doubt that liberty and
equality are irreconcilably opposed. Liberty and equality have
different structures; one is either free or not free, regardless of
whether someone else is free or not. In this sense, liberty is not
a relative value. Equality, on the other hand, is a relative, comparative concept in which one is more or less equal to another
92. FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL, supra note 4, at 186.
93. For example, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, John Rawls and Jirgen
Habermas.
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with respect to goods or property. This difference implies the
possible combinations of the two. Nino wrote, however, that an
egalitarian distribution of liberty or personal autonomy should
be promoted.9" The principle of personal inviolability opens the
possibility of reducing the autonomy of some persons in order to
raise it for those who started out with a lower level of autonomy.
Such restrictions derive from Rawls' difference principle, which
does not imply a total equalization of autonomy for everyone,
but rather recognizes that greater autonomy for some is justified
if it increases the autonomy of those who possess it to a lesser
degree. Nino sustains the idea of equality "not as equalization,
but as non-exploitation: a greater autonomy is illegitimate if it
has been obtained at the expense of lesser autonomy for oth95
ers."
If understood in this way, the principle of personal inviolability opens the door for the justification of positive duties restricting the liberty of some in the name of equality. The difficult question is where the limit should be:
[Although this limit cannot be determined a priori through
some precise formula, we must necessarily conclude that
positive duties to further the autonomy of the less autonomous - either directly or through the State - must preserve
the choice9 and realization of plans of life in a recognizable
measure. 6
Although there are no precise limits, egalitarian liberalism
advocates so-called social rights as a derivation of individual
rights. For example, it is practically inconsistent to approve a
right to life and at the same time not accept that there is a duty
to provide food to the needy or medical treatment to the sick.
Nino believed that a liberalism of this kind is not committed to
any specific economic system. It should be clear that such liberalism does not leave room for a totalitarian collectivism nor for
an absolutely free market system that generates intolerable
inequalities. Between these two extremes, however, there are a
number of intermediate possibilities that should be democratically explored.

94. Id. at 188.
95. Id. at 192.
96. Id. at 192-93.
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It has repeatedly been observed that democracy is incompatible with liberalism. One argument is that majority decisions
lose all sense in the face of a system of rights as strong as that
assumed by liberals. If democracy should respect rights, then
the only questions that could be decided democratically would be
morally neutral, but insubstantial. The reply to this, according
to Nino, depends on how one justifies democracy. Nino believed
democracy is justified by its epistemic moral value. As noted
supra, majority decisions reached through orderly procedures
have a higher probability of being morally correct.
We must, however, examine Nino's conception of the relationship between rights and democracy in order to explain what
he believed to be the connection between the latter and liberalism. Nino thought that there are two kinds of rights. First, there
are a priori rights that are a precondition to democratic discourse, ranging from individual to social rights. Second, there
are those rights that are posterior to democratic procedure because their existence and range is determined through the process of discussion and collective decision. What is important
about this distinction, though, is that the a priori rights are not
subject to democratic discussion. Also excluded from democratic
procedures are moral questions concerning ideals of personal
excellence belonging exclusively to the individual domain. This
is due to the recognition of the value of autonomy and the principle of personal dignity. The epistemic value of democracy does
not extend to the ideals of personal excellence.
What then is the relation between rights, democracy and
liberalism? According to Nino,
the epistemological justification of democracy provides the
basis for a reconciliation between liberalism and democracy:
democracy, with all its imperfections, is the most adequate
means to secure the recognition of the principles of liberalism. This requires, of course, that democracy satisfy a priori
rights, and it also implies that the epistemic value of democracy is greater or lesser, depending on whether the procedures of discussion and decision fulfill to a greater or lesser
extent the requirements of a broad and open discussion . ..

97. Id. at 209-10.
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It is therefore necessary to adapt the institutions of democracy
to enable them to fulfill their epistemic function, for example,
via fostering free discussion or consensual decisions.
Nino was in fact a fraternal, egalitarian and democratic
liberal. His liberal conception is also reflected in his treatment
of basic needs. In his view, basic needs play an important role
within a liberal conception of society.9" Nino thought that there
is no conceptual link between the notion of categorical needs and
those of wishes or preferences. Categorical needs are needs arising from ends that are not themselves dependent on individual
wishes or preferences. Categorical or absolute needs should be
identified with states of affairs that are prerequisites for autonomy, since personal autonomy is a value basic to a liberal conception of society. Personal autonomy, Nino observed, has two aspects: its creation and its exercise.
Some may argue that individuals must be treated equally
regarding their exercise of autonomy and the results therefrom.
The supporting reasoning recognizes that these individuals value the act of choosing a plan of life, independently of the existence of the corresponding resources. Once an individual makes
his choice, all other persons are committed to contribute to the
satisfaction of his life plan. This choice allows the individual to
reach the same level of satisfaction as all others who, in turn,
are guaranteed the satisfaction of the objectives of their life
plans.
Others emphasize the conditions surrounding a choice of
realizable life plans. Here, the capacity and creativity in
choosing plans of life in accordance with existing resources is
valued. Nino points out that this version of autonomy, while
more attractive than the former, implies that autonomy is seen
in the context of a wider conception of self-realization, understood as the full and balanced development of an individual's
capacities.9 9 There are many alternatives to the exercise of an

98. See Carlos Nino, Autonomia y Necesidades Bdsicas, 7 DOXA 21 (1989).
99. Carlos Nino here uses the word "capacity" in the same sense as Amartya
Sen speaks of "capacity" to refer not to what an individual actually does or is, but
to what he or she could do or be. This is interesting because two individuals with
the same bundle of goods could be or do very different things, since there is the
possibility of combining the goods in different ways. Sen's egalitarian position, then,
refers to the level of "capacities."
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individual's personal capacities and we should value the creativity in taking advantage of them. This position suggests that the
basic needs necessary to give individuals equal capacity should
be satisfied. This is important because it implies that a portion
of public resources should be used to satisfy the preconditions
for the choice of life plans that can be realized to some degree,
rather than for the satisfaction of individual preferences:
Only in this way do we promote the creativity of individuals
in the construction of their life that does not merely consist
in an initial exercise of the imagination but is a virtue coming to light in all the choices we make in the course of our
life, in view of certain given conditions that do not adapt to
each of these assessments. 1"
This implies that the state should contribute to the maximization of an individuals' capacities. In addition, the central role of
self-realization allows individuals to decide which of the many
alternative ways they want to go.
According to Nino, there is still another point where basic
needs play a relevant role in the liberal conception of society. By
placing emphasis upon the satisfaction of individual preferences,
satisfaction of the preferences of some would collide with the
preferences of others. The lives of individuals would be severely
affected by the decisions of others. This clashes with the liberal
principle of personal inviolability that prohibits one's decision to
affect the life of another, unless they are intersubjectively justified. To satisfy the conditions for the exercise of individual capacities and to serve as a protection from the decisions and preferences of others, certain basic needs must be satisfied for an
egalitarian distribution of goods:
Thus, the concept of basic needs not only is central to a liberal conception of society but also creates a link between the
two basis ideas of liberalism - that the ends of individuals
should be respected, and that every individual is an end in
itself - by permitting their simultaneous satisfaction."1

100. Autonomia y Necesidades Bdsicas, supra note 98, at 32.
101. Id. at 34.
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Nino's liberal conception is manifested in his defense of
liberalism against communitarian attacks.0 2 Evidently,
communitarianism is directly influenced by Hegel, from whom it
takes the eminently social character of man and the idea of a
necessary relation between morality and the customs of society.10 3 Also, communitarianism draws from Aristotle the idea
of good as linked to human nature. Among the communitarians
most hostile to liberal positions are Alistair MacIntyre, Michael
Sandel, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer. In his defense of
liberalism, Nino used the following pattern of argumentation:
First, he describes how communitarianism reconstructs the
liberal doctrine; second, he presents the communitarian critique,
which he finally subjects to a critical examination. The same
course is followed in presentation of his thesis.
MacIntyre, a spokesman for the communitarians, characterized liberalism according to five distinctive traits: (1) morality
consists of rules that would be accepted by any rational person
under ideal circumstances; (2) these rules are neutral with respect to individual interests; (3) moral standards are also neutral with respect to the different individually held conceptions of
the good; (4) the addressees of moral rules are individuals, not
collective entities; (5) moral rules must be applied equally to all
human beings.
The main critical points advanced by communitarianism
against each of these elements of liberalism, according to Nino,
are as follows. First, through abstraction and universalization,
liberals empty morality of all content and make it impossible to
draw substantive moral standards from it. The thesis of morality
as independent of a conception of the good is untenable. Second,
individuals, as seen through the liberal prism, are too abstract
and universal and cannot form the basis of a social morality.
With respect to the ideals of human excellence, liberal neutrality
is possible only if one assumes that moral agents are noumenal
beings and that their identity is independent even of their desires and preferences. Third, liberals hold an atomistic concep-

102. ETICA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, supra note 7, at 129; FUNDAMENTOS DE
DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL, supra note 4, at 178; EL CONSTRUCTISMO ETICO, supra
note 8, at 137; Carlos Nino, Liberalismo 'versus' Comunitarismo, 1 REVISTA DEL
CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES 363 (1988).
103. See generally GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL,

HEGEL (Carl J. Friedrich eds. 1953).
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tion of human beings; they present them as self-sufficient and
independent of any social context. In fact, human beings can
only be thought of as belonging to some community because this
is what determines their personal identity. On this basis, Nino
tries to distinguish the following characteristics for the
communitarian approach:
In the first place, there is the derivation of the principles of
justice and moral correctness from a specific conception of the
good. Second, a conception of the good in which the social
element is of central and even primordial importance. Third,
the relativization of the rights and obligations of individuals
in terms of their relations with other individuals, their position in society, and the particular properties of that society.
Finally, the fact that the moral critique depends on the moral
practice of each society as it is manifest in its traditions,
conventions and social institutions. 0"
Nino maintains that the communitarian theses have two
faces: a nice one with its sharp and not always mistaken critique
of liberalism, and a sinister, frightening one with a tendency to
take perfective, holistic positions, advancing a certain kind of
conservative relativism. First of all, the priority of good over
individual rights justifies perfectionist measures. If rights were
only instruments in the pursuit of the good, they would have to
be given up every time there is a collision. The idea of good
would have to be imposed even against individual will. Besides,
the priority of society together with the idea of good promote
policies of personal sacrifice that favor the community. Finally,
making criticism dependent on moral practice generates a conservative relativism in that effective social practice is the ultimate judge in moral conflicts.
To counter the attacks of communitarianism, Nino's strategy
consists of weakening some of the proposed premises of liberalism while simultaneously strengthening the core of the liberal
conception. In this sense, communitarianism did serve to expose
errors in liberal positions. Nino argued that the idea of a radical
dissociation of critique and moral practice must be weakened.
Furthermore, the conception of democracy should not be considered definitive but rather we should adopt the practice of moral

104. Autonomia y Necesidades Bdsicas, supra note 98, at 32.
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discussion with all the prerequisites and procedures practiced
today in the Western world. This practice draws criticism because it basically consists of advancing arguments in favor or
against certain positions. The criticism of the practice of criticizing itself is the only thing that must be excluded. This way one
would accept a very mild form of conventionalism or relativism.
If the function of moral practice is to manage conflicts by
fostering cooperation between persons in search of consensus,
then some of the rules of that practice are determined by the
goals they want to reach. Because principles must be accepted
freely and voluntarily on their own merit, their acceptability
must be determined counterfactually, under ideal conditions of
rationality and impartiality, and on the basis of general and
universal principles:
This implies that communitarianism commits a radical contradiction: on the one hand, it defends a relativist and
conventionalist metaethical position, and on the other, it
criticizes the current culture for incorporating as essential
elements the assumptions of Kantian liberalism. But the fact
that these assumptions are effectively incorporated in our
moral discourse, even in that of the communitarians themselves, makes them unassailable. Therefore, if what
communitarians themselves say about the common culture is
true, then the communitarian attack presupposes what it is
attacking. This attack, then, seems to be an intent to change
those assumptions rather than to argue against them."5
According to Nino, the integration of moral discourse in
Western culture allows one to refute communitarian attacks on
liberalism's conception of moral agents as beings that are isolated from any social context, mutually separate, and independent
of their wishes and preferences. This objection is exaggerated.
Liberals do not describe real people of flesh and blood in these
terms. Rather, this way of thinking corresponds to a heuristic
construction of the normative preconditions of moral discourse.
Even if communitarians accepted this, one of their strongest
objections would still require an answer; from such a construction no substantive moral norms can be inferred. It would be

105. Carlos S. Nino, Liberalismo versus Comunitarismo, REVISTA DEL CENTRO DE
ESTUDIos CONSTITUCIONALES, Sept.-Dec. 1988, at 371.
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impossible to derive rights without some conception of good.
Liberals do, however, possess a conception of what is socially good due to their recognition of the value of autonomy. Thus,
moral discourse does not rest on procedural rules only. It also
incorporates the substantive value of autonomy in connection
with the foundation of human rights. Nino posits that this substantive liberal conception of good, including the value of autonomy, should refer to the idea of self-realization:
I think that the central core of Kantian liberalism is
strengthened considerably if the following two concessions to
communitarianism are made: It is certain that moral criticism must somehow be connected with moral practice; but
precisely our own culture does have a practice that subjects
all other conventions and traditions to criticism, on the basis
of impartially acceptable universal principles. And it also
seems to be true that this practice of moral discourse presupposes a full conception of the good because otherwise it could
not lead to the principles liberals defend; but this conception
of the good includes as an essential, though not the only,
component the value of impartially distributed autonomy,
and any action endangering that autonomy in the name of
the good is self-defeating." 6
VIII. CONCLUSION
A number of years ago, Manuel Atienza published a book on
legal philosophy in the Argentine Republic. 7 The work clearly
presents the main theses of the most important Argentinean
legal philosophers. According to Atienza, it was necessary at
that time to undertake studies about the legitimacy of the law
and of human rights; such studies had been neglected or developed in an incomplete, insufficient and conservative manner by
Neothomists who lacked and still lack any theoretical relevance.
Atienza's book recognized Nino as one of the most brilliant
young legal philosophers of Argentina. It was Nino who worked
in the areas with the greatest theoretical deficit in Argentinean
legal-philosophical thinking. Nino pulled the problems of the

106. Id. at 376.
107. MANUEL ATIENZA, LA FILOSOFiA DEL DERECHO ARGENTINA AcTuAL (1984).
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justification of law and human rights from the obscurities of
Argentinean natural law doctrine and put them into a context of
discussion characterized by rigor and a substantial degree of
clarity. Independently of whether or not one agrees with his
theses, this was one of Carlos Nino's greatest merits.
Presenting ideas with clarity has been and is one of the
central objectives of those who call themselves analytical philosophers. This preoccupation with clarity and analysis tempts
philosophers to work on such a high level of abstraction, creating such a sophisticated conceptual apparatus that they appear
to have lost sight of the problem they sought to solve. This is
especially problematic in the area of legal philosophy. The center
of legal-philosophical reflection should be the law, and results
obtained through such reflection should be useful to legal practice.
Nino was perfectly conscious of this, and he always tried to
relate even the most abstract aspects of philosophical work to
positive law, referring in his early works to criminal law and
later to constitutional law. He combined analytical conceptual
rigor with an effort to formulate solutions to material problems
of positive law. He tried to write and teach simply law, and his
work was closer to that of a professor of law in the United
States than to that of a typical professor of law in his own cultural context. From a purely descriptive point of view, one could
say that Carlos Nino was the most "anglo-saxon" of all Spanishspeaking legal philosophers.
Nino's conceptions of human rights and of the justification
of democracy have had a strong intellectual..8 and practical
impact. From a practical point of view, Nino's influence is evident in a number of measures implemented by the Alfonsin
administration, especially in the area of human rights. His influence is also seen in several projects of constitutional reform in
Argentina. Nino was a great teacher with numerous disciples, in
108. Theoretically, his theses have been widely received and discussed not only
in the Spanish-speaking world, but also in the German, English and Italian languages. There is ample evidence of this in the frequent references to his work,
translations of his works, and original publications in foreign languages. The growing
interest for his thinking is also shown by the fact that in September 1994, Yale
University organized a Symposium on Legal Philosophy in his honor. In addition,
Robert Alexy of the University of Kiel taught a course based on The Ethics of Human Rights in the summer of 1994.
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Argentina and the United States. He was very generous with his
time, devoting long hours to educating the young. Nino committed himself to the foundation of institutions that provided a
framework for the development of rational discussion in response to the academic and economic weakness of Argentinean
universities. He believed that rational discussion was the only
way to solve problems because it eliminates the errors in one's
own reasoning and opinions. He developed institutions that
provided rational discussions to promote the effective validity of
human rights and democracy. Together with Eugenio Bulygin,
Genaro Carri6 and others, Nino founded the Centro de Estudios
Institucionales (CEI). This Center became a meeting point for
scholars from various legal cultures including Italy, the United
States, Finland, Spain, Germany, Mexico and others.
Carlos Nino hoped his work would become a solid and coherent whole. He died at his peak and while his theses were still
developing. Some of his most radical assertions give rise to a
number of questions but to present them here would distract
from the objective of this Article. It is not at all obvious that one
should accept democracy without question, even as a regulative
ideal that does have an epistemic function. Nor is it obvious that
Nino's conception of the consensual justification of punishment
is useful when it comes to legitimizing punishment to those who
violate the most basic human rights. With respect to his attempts to link politics, morality and the law, it is also far from
evident that his efforts were successful. Independent of the
doubts and disagreements Nino's work is apt to provoke, it is
only just to acknowledge that at the basis of any of his positions
there was always the examination of a thesis. His works are
thought-provoking and intellectually stimulating and they invite
further development and perfection of his line of argument. This
is possibly the best aspect of his legacy.
I knew Nino for many years, and gained immensely from his
friendship and intellectual excellence. In spite of his many responsibilities, he was always open for dialogue, managed to find
time to discuss ideas, read draft papers or debate his own arguments. During his last three years, he repeatedly visited Barcelona and the University Pompeu Fabra. He proved tireless in his
marathonian seminars. After three or four hours of discussion,
we could never be sure whether his opponent's defeat was by
force of argument or simply through physical exhaustion. He
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was also an absent-minded man. It was typical for him to come
to dinner at my house twenty-four hours after the agreed time.
He always wore jackets a bit tight, grasped the collars with both
hands in a useless gesture to bring them together, and raised
his head to address his interlocutors. He moved around in nervous steps, setting loose an avalanche of words that left one in
awe. It was just as impossible to make him stop working as it
was to silence him.
Nino's death has left a profound vacuum, not only because it
robbed us of one of the most brilliant representatives of legal
theory and philosophy, but because he more intensely than anyone was committed to educating new generations and to stimulating dialogue between legal scholars from different traditions.
I am one of a great number of people who are indebted to Carlos
Nino. My stay at Yale was due partly to his insistence, and
partly to a common project. His death has left us all poorer.

